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ENFORCING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACTAGAINST THE
STATES
JEAN 0. MELIOUS*
The federal government needs to butt out-this is our state.'
-Washington State Senator Marilyn Rasmussen
I. INTRODUCTION
A big federal stick, the Endangered Species Act (ESA),2 drives
many state and local efforts to preserve biodiversity. The ESA commands
all citizens and political subdivisions to avoid the "take" of species. 3 In
practical terms, however, the federal government4 cannot control all of the
activities that determine whether species will survive. Most species listed
as threatened or endangered under the ESA
5 live on non-federal land.6
Furthermore, many of the problems that endangered species face cannot
be solved without the use of powers, including land use controls and water
' Jean Melious is an Associate Professor at Huxley College of Environmental Studies at
Western Washington University. She received a J.D. from Harvard Law School and an
M.Phil. in Urban Design and Regional Planning from the University of Edinburgh.
1 Irrigators Seek Public Support, THE BELLINGHAM (WA.) HERALD, Nov. 25, 1999, at
B6.
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994).
3 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994).
4 The ESA is implemented by the Department of the Interior, for non-marine species,
and by the Department of Commerce, for most marine species, including anadromous
fish. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994); 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.2(b); 50 C.F.R. pts. 222.23(a),
227.4 (1998) (designating listed species over which the Secretary of Commerce has
jurisdiction). The functions of the Secretary of the Interior have been delegated to the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service and those of the Secretary of Commerce to the
National Marine Fisheries Service. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15), 1533(a)(1) (1994) (statutory
authority to delegate).
5 The Endangered Species Act's "take" prohibition applies to wildlife species listed as
endangered or threatened in 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.12. 50 C.F.R. pts. 17.3 & 17.21 (1999).
6 More than ninety percent of the listed species for which FWS was responsible as of
May 1993 have habitat on nonfederal lands. Approximately two-thirds of the listed
species have over sixty percent of their total habitat on nonfederal lands. See U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES
PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 1 (1994).
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rights administration, that are within the domain of state and local
governments.
7
As a result, the role of states in ESA compliance is increasing
dramatically. States are proactively preparing their own programs in order
to avoid species listing, to manage state lands, and to coordinate state,
federal, and private efforts to protect species over wide geographical
areas.8  Furthermore, many states have entered into contractual
arrangements with private landowners under the Habitat Conservation
Plan provisions of the ESA. 9 Because of the reciprocal obligations that
these contracts create, private parties may need to enforce the state's
contractual obligations. Thus, both environmental interest groups and
private parties have a strong interest in the enforceability of states'
obligations under the ESA.
In light of these important and desirable developments in the
federalism of the ESA, the United States Supreme Court's recent use of
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution to reduce
private party enforcement rights against states comes at a critical moment
for biodiversity. This obscure and impenetrable area of constitutional
federalism could significantly affect the litigation strategy of interest
groups, while providing a difficult obstacle to private parties who want to
assert contractual rights against states." I
The text of the Eleventh Amendment, which appears innocuous
enough, simply provides that citizens of one state may not sue citizens of
another state in federal court; nor may foreign citizens sue a state in
7 A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REv. 1315, 1318 (1995); see also
J. David Aiken, Balancing Endangered Species Protection and Irrigation Water Rights:
The Platte River Cooperative Agreement, 3 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 119, 124-
126 (1999) (discussing federal court decisions involving water rights and the ESA);
Michelle Nijhuis, Who's Stopping Sprawl? The Endangered Species Act Goes to Town,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 30, 1999, at 1 (Sprawl, which is addressed primarily by state
and local land use controls, is "the toughest problem the [Endangered Species] Act faces"
lintemal quotation omitted]).
See infra, text accompanying notes 55-81.
1 16 U.S.C. §1535 (2001).
"'See infra, text accompanying notes 105-112.
1 The definition of "state" under the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence includes state agencies. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr.
Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199 (1929) (Eleventh Amendment immunizes state agency that was
"but the arm or alter ego of the State"). The rationale is that a plaintiff who successfully
sues an arm of the state has a judgment with "'the same effect as if it were rendered
against the State for the amount specified in the complaint."' Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S.
436, 439 (1900).
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federal court.12 In a recent series of Supreme Court cases,' 3 however, a
five-member majority of the Court has found that the Eleventh
Amendment is surrounded by a "penumbra"'14 of state sovereign immunity
that protects states from many private lawsuits brought under federal law.
The Court's stated goal in this restriction of private lawsuits is to enhance
the "dignity" of states 15 and to prevent private parties from seeking to
require states to comly with their federal obligations by conducting "raids
on state treasuries."]
12 U.S. Const. amend. XI.
13 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress
cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity to suit in federal court under its Commerce
Clause authority); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (finding a
constitutional "penumbra" that limits the scope of an exception to state sovereign
immunity when state officials are sued for prospective relief); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999) (expanding the Eleventh Amendment's "penumbra" in holding that Congress
cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity to suit in state court); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that
although Congress can, in theory, abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating
under the Fourteenth Amendment, such legislation must be "appropriate" in addressing a
Fourteenth Amendment evil or wrong; it was not necessary for Congress to address state
infringement of patents, which was not shown to be significant enough for Congress to
address through Fourteenth Amendment legislation); and Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that no waiver
of state sovereign immunity will be found when a state voluntarily engages in activities
regulated by federal law).
1 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 665 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting): "The full reach of [Seminole Tribe's] dramatic
expansion of the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity is unpredictable; its
dimensions are defined only by the present majority's perception of constitutional
penumbras rather than constitutional text." Majority opinions prefer to refer to the
penumbra by formulations such as "the original understanding" (Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. at 726), "the founders' understanding" (Id. at 734), and the "essential principles of
federalism" (Id. at 748).
15 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 715 ("The generation that designed and adopted
our federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity..
. .11).
16 Id. at 720 (quoting D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789-1801 at 196 (1997)). The majority opinion in Alden v. Maine goes so far
as to suggest that states should be able to ignore federal obligations if they decide that
they have more important fiscal goals:
A general federal power to authorize private suits for money damages
would place unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern in
accordance with the will of their citizens. Today, as at the time of the
founding, the allocation of scarce resources among competing needs
and interests lies at the heart of the political process. While the
judgment creditor of the State may have a legitimate claim for
6072001]
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Environmental groups are likely to be less than impressed by the
states' "dignity" when the states conduct activities harmful to endangered
species or fail to comply with obligations to protect species. Private
property owners may not appreciate the characterization of their efforts to
require states to comply with contractual obligations under the ESA as a
"raid on state treasuries." Because of their Eleventh Amendment
immunity, however, states may be able to prevent environmentalists and
landowners alike from direct efforts to enforce the states' obligations.
Private parties may have to rely on surrogate implementation efforts
including waiting for the federal government to sue the states, focusing on
enforcement of county, municipal, or other non-state obligations, or
pursuing the enforcement of state species-protection laws in state court
rather than suing under the ESA in federal court.
None of these surrogates is perfect. Federal, enforcement efforts
are limited by budget, by politics, and by the fact that federal interests may
not be concurrent with private interests. Even assuming that the state has
applicable law, local politics may ensure that state courts are less-desirable
forums for suits against the states than federal courts. These factors must
be weighed against persistent calls from commentators of all ideological
stripes to Frovide states with an increased role in endangered species
protection.
This article will first discuss the role of the states under the
Endangered Species Act, identifying state linkages with the federal
compensation, other important needs and worthwhile ends compete for
access to the public fisc. Since all cannot be satisfied in full, it is
inevitable that difficult decisions involving the most sensitive and
political of judgments must be made.
Id. at 750-51 (emphasis added). As Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Stevens, noted in dissent, "[t]he 'judgment creditor' in question is not a dunning
bill-collector, but a citizen whose federal rights have been violated.... ." Id. at 803.
17 See, e.g., William J. Snape, IH & Heather L. Weiner, Recipe for Reauthorization of the
Endangered Species Act, 5 DuKE EN'VTL. L. & POL'Y F. 61, 65 (1995) (The authors,
lawyers for Defenders of Wildlife, state that "[in order to effectively address localized
threats to listed species and their habitats, much of the authority now vested in the federal
government should be transferred to or shared with state governments."); J.B. Ruhl,
Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating
Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 555,
(1995) (Although "the ESA simply does not get where biodiversity conservation policy
says we should be headed," id. at 588, regional planning efforts under state endangered
species protection initiatives "hold promise as a means of biodiversity protection." Id. at
600, n. 130); Mark Squillace, Applying the Park City Principles to the Endangered
Species Act, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 385, 397 (1996) ("By promoting greater state
involvement, the FWS can help instill a sense of ownership in the ESA program .... ").
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government and areas in which states exercise independent authority to
implement species preservation programs. It will then discuss constraints
on enforcement efforts against the states, focusing on sovereign immunity
barriers erected by the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment cases. After
an evaluation of possible enforcement options available to private parties,
the article will conclude that the issue of state enforceability will have
substantive and strategic implications for the future development of ESA
federalism.
II. THE ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
A. State Roles in Endangered Species Preservation
Congress passed the ESA in 1973, when "cooperative federalism"
whs in vogue and issue-by-issue environmental regulation was the norm.
Some ESA "proponents envisioned that it would be implemented under a
cooperative federalism model similar to that embodied in the Clean Water
Act."' 8  The ESA has not adopted this cooperative federalism model,
however, in which the federal government dictates the content of
programs and state governments carry out the programs. Because all
biodiversity issues, like all politics, are local, 19 and because states have
traditionally exercised primary authority over wildlife and natural resource
regulation, a model is emerging that "allows state and local governments
to define the content of federal mandates."20 This model has been referred
to as "partnership federalism."
21
This state contribution to the content of the ESA's mandates is
developed and implemented through the states' many roles in biodiversity
preservation, discussed in the following sections.
18 119 CONG. REc. 25, 669-70 (1973); see also Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta
Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 341, 357 (1996).
19 See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its
Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 555, 557-58 (1993). While pollution control is highly-
centralized-"the federal government formulates technology-forcing standards and the
states implement them"-biodiversity protection, in contrast, "is becoming more
decentralized and site-specific"). Id. at 557.20 Tarlock, supra note 7, at 1351.
21 Id.
6092001]
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1. States as Proprietors
The most obvious state role in endangered species preservation is
as proprietor of land and natural resources. The Washington State
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Habitat Conservation Plan
(HCP), for example, includes 1.63 million acres of DNR timberland
within the range of the northern spotted owl. The DNR holds these lands
in trust for designated beneficiaries, including public schools, certain
counties, and state prisons. DNR has a fiduciary responsibility to the
trusts, which had resulted in land management practices that conflicted
with the ESA. During the course of HCP negotiations, participants have
observed that DNR's primary goal was to achieve regulatory certainty for
its management activities and to ensure that any plan that developed was
in the best interest of the trusts.22 This proprietary role thus may oblige
states to balance species preservation issues with their obligations to
produce income for state citizens, a role that has the practical effect of
establishing economic concerns as an important aspect of species
preservation programs.
2. States as Resource Managers
Resource management, including the management of game
species, fisheries, timber, and water resources, is another important state
role- "As successors to the Crown, the states retained jurisdiction over
common property resources, including fish and game. ' ,23  State
management of fish and game species has significant potential to lead to
22 Jeff Opperman, The Washington Department of Natural Resources Habitat
Conservation Plan (1998), available at http://www.ncedr.org/casestudies/hcp/wadnr.htm,
in IMPROVING INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCE PLANNING: HABITAT CONSERVATION
PLANS (National Center for Environmental Decision-Making Research, 1998) available
at http://www.ncedr.org/casestudies/hcp/. Oregon also manages some state forest lands
under HCPs. See Michael C. Blumm & Jonathan Loworn, The Proposed Transfer of
BLM Timber Lands to the State of Oregon: Environmental and Economic Questions, 32
LAND & WATER L. REV. 353, 403 (1997); see also Paola Bemazzani, The Jackson
Demonstration State Forest Habitat Conservation Plan (1998) (describing a HCP used to
manage the 50,000-acre Jackson Demonstration State Forest in California), available at
http://www.ncedr.org/casestudies/hcp/jackson.htn, in IMPROVING INTEGRATED NATURAL
RESOURCE PLANNING: HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS (National Center for
Environmental Decision-Making Research, 1998) available at http://www.ncedr.org/
casestudies/hcp/.
23 DAVID A. ADAMS, RENEWABLE RESOURCE POLICY: THE LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS 47 (1993).
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direct conflicts with the ESA through the implementation of policies or
management practices that may implement other state goals at the expense
of endangered or threatened species.
24
State management of timber resources, which includes both state-
owned land. and state legislation that influences private forestland
25-
management, constitutes another direct link to the ESA. State timber
management was an important factor in many of the bitter battles over the
spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest 26 and remains controversial in the era
of large-scale salmon listings.
27
Finally, the state role in water resources is an issue that will
assuredly increase in importance, particularly in the water-starved west.
One commentator has noted that
[I]n two of the three federal court decisions involving water
rights and the ESA, the use of existing water rights were
significantly curtailed to protect endangered species. In the
third case, all the water from a new federal reservoir was
dedicated to endangered species protection .... No cases
reported to date provide any assurance to appropriators that
24 See, e.g., Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D.
Haw. 1979), affd 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding state management of feral sheep
and goats for hunting purposes violated ESA by destroying listed species' habitat);
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding state fisheries licensing scheme
violated ESA); Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Washington
and Oregon state regulations governing fishing in the Columbia River, resulting in
incidental take of listed Snake River fall chinook salmon, were authorized by a Section 7
incidental take statement issued for the relevant geographical area).25 Thomas Lundmark, Methods of Forest Law-Making, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 783,
785 n.11 and accompanying text (1995); see also id. at 792-97 (discussing state
regulation and regulatory agencies).2 6 See WILLIAM DIETRICH, THE FINAL FOREST: THE BATTLE FOR THE LAST GREAT TREES
OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 178-90 (1992).
27 See, e.g., Threatened Status for Three Chinook Salmon Evolutionarily Significant
Units (ESUs) in Washington and Oregon, and Endangered Status for One Chinook
Salmon ESU in Washington, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308, 14,325-26 (1999) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pts. 223 and 224) ("Examples of federal actions likely to affect chinook salmon in
the listed ESUs include authorized land management activities of the USFS [United
States Forest Service] and BLM [Bureau of Land Management] . . . Such activities
include timber sales and harvests .. . ."). A federal district court judge recently ruled that
twenty-four Oregon timber sales could not go forward until the federal government
ensured that they will not harm listed salmon. Barbara Rothstein, Judge Blocks 24
Timber Sales; Says Assessment of Fish on Oregon Parcels Not Done, THE NEWS
TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 1, 1999, at B8.
6112001 ]
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their water use will be protected against the claims of
endangered species protection.28
When states allocate water among competing users by issuing
water rights, the effects on endangered species could lead to state ESA
liability.2 States also make a host of licensing and regulatory decisions
relating to irrigation and power production. To the extent that these
decisions harm listed species, they are likely to lead states into the
regulatory web of the ESA.30
3. States as Permit Authorities under Other Federal Environmental Laws
In addition to their natural resource management role, states also
have permit authority under the cooperative federalism provisions of other
federal environmental laws. The issuance of permits under the Clean
Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 31
in particular, has the potential to affect endangered species by allowing the
discharge of pollutants that could directly harm aquatic organisms or
modify their habitat. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, most states have
established and administered their own permit programs, subject to federal
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approval and oversight.32
States that issue NPDES permits, unlike federal agencies, are not
subject to the ESA's requirements to consult with FWS or NMFS prior to
issuing a permit that could jeopardize a listed species.33 In evaluating state
programs, however, the EPA has taken into account the need for state
agencies to consider the impacts of permits on endangered species. In two
recent cases, the Tenth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have addressed
28 Aiken, supra note 7, at 124.
29 One court has held that state water rights do not prevail over the restrictions set forth in
the Act. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134
(1992). This holding, combined with the view of causation expressed by the court in
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that state action which specifically
allows licensed parties to harm species violates the ESA), creates the possibility of state
ESA liability based on the issuance of water rights. Parties would still have to show,
however, that the issuance of water rights actually killed listed species by reducing water
levels to the point at which the species could no longer survive. See Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697 n.9 (1995)
(holding activities that "harm" species must "actually kill or injure" the species).30 See generally Aiken, supra note 7 (discussing Platte River water projects and the ESA).
31 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(a), 1342 (1994).
32 Id. § 1342(b).
33 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
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EPA requirements that conditioned approval of state NPDES programs on
the implementation of a process for federal review of permit impacts on
listed species. In both cases, the American Forest & Paper Association
(AFPA), a trade association that includes pulp and paper manufacturers 34
challenged the EPA requirements. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the
challenge based on standing, while the Fifth Circuit upheld the challenge,
holding that the EPA had exceeded its authority.35
In the Fifth Circuit case, American Forest & Paper Assn. v. EPA,36
the court reviewed EPA's decision to require the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (LDEQ) to submit proposed NPDES permits to
FWS and NMFS for review. If the federal agencies objected to the permit
and LDEQ did not modify it, EPA would exercise its veto authority over
the permit.37 The court first found that the AFPA had standing to sue
because its members included permit holders in Louisiana.3' Although the
AFPA did not allege that any of its members had applied for a new permit
or sought to modify an existing one, the court found that AFPA's
allegation that injury was imminent was sufficient for standing purposes. 39
The court then rejected EPA's legal argument. EPA contended
that the Clean Water Act4 ° directs EPA to Fromulgate guidelines
governing state permitting programs under the Act. 1 EPA then pointed to
the ESA provision 42 requiring federal agencies to consult with FWS andNMFS before undertaking any "agency action."43 Considered together,
EPA argued, these provisions authorized EPA to adopt the challenged
rule.44 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, however, holding that the Clean Water
Act required EPA to approve state programs if they met nine specified
criteria and that EPA did not have discretion to add a tenth criterion, based
on ESA concerns. 45 The court concluded that
34 American Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 154 F.3d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1998).
" 154 F.3d at 1160; American Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 298 (5th Cir.
1998).
36 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998).
31 Id. at 294.
38 Id. at 296.
39 id.
40 33 U.S.C. § 1314(i) (1994).
41 137 F.3d at 297.
42 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
43 American Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
4id.
45 Id. at 297-98.
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[T]he ESA serves not as a font of new authority, but as
something far more modest: a directive to agencies to
channel their existing authority in a particular direction.
The upshot is that EPA cannot invoke the ESA as a means
of creating and imposing requirements that are not
authorized by the [Clean Water Act].4
In the Tenth Circuit case of the same name,47 in contrast, petitioner
AFPA did not succeed in convincing the court that its members would
pass the "injury in fact" requirement of standing. 48 The case involved
Oklahoma's NPDES program. EPA and the Oklahoma Department of
Environmental Quality (ODEQ) signed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) committing them to consult on permit applications to ensure
compliance with the ESA.4 9 The agreement further provided that ODEQ
would consult with FWS when NPDES permits would affect sensitive
water, that ODEQ would identify based on FWS information.50 If ODEQ
and FWS could not agree on modifying the permit application to avoid
harming the listed species or its habitat, EPA could object to the permit
and assume permitting authority.
5 1
The AFPA did not identify any of its members as currently
discharing into sensitive waters or intending to discharge into sensitive
waters. The court found that its members had not shown injury in fact,
rejecting the AFPA's generalized argument that the mere existence of the
consultation provisions, and of EPA's possible veto, ensures increased
costs and delays that injured its members. 3
These cases demonstrate another area in which private parties have
a strong interest in the states' role under the ESA. While the AFPA was
concerned over what it viewed as an excessively stringent interpretation of
the ESA, other interest groups have expressed concern that states may not
be sufficiently restrictive in their application of the ESA. These concerns
4Id. at 299.47 American Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 154 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1998).
41 id. at 1159-60.
49 Id. at 1156-58.
" Id. at 1157.
51 Id.52 American Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 154 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 1998).
53 Id. The court distinguished the Fifth Circuit's ruling in American Forest & Paper
Ass 'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998), by noting that the two consultation programs
may have been different. The Oklahoma program only referred to "sensitive waters"
while the court did not discuss the scope of the Louisiana rule. American Forest & Paper
Ass'n v. EPA, 154 F.3d 1155, 1160 n.8 (10th Cir. 1998).
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have been particularly prominent during the preparation of statewide
programs intended to avoid federal listing of species, discussed in the
following section.
4. States as Content-Providers: State Plan Formulation to Avoid Federal
Regulation under the ESA
The lesson of the spotted owl has come home to roost in a number
of states facing large-scale listings under the ESA. Rather than waiting for
the ESA "train wreck" to hit, these states have attempted to take a
proactive role by developing a plan to protect species before they are
listed. This approach is intended to avoid the imposition of federal
regulations that state citizens might resent and to involve local decision-
makers in the formulation of plans.
The State of Oregon, for example, developed the Oregon Coastal
Salmon Restoration Initiative Plan (OCSRI)54 in response to the National
Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) proposed rule listing an Oregon run of
coho salmon as a threatened species.55 In 1995, Governor John Kitzhaber
directed a wide range of state agencies56 to develop new programs and
implement measures intended to preserve salmon. The state's role in this
program was substantive and significant, as indicated by the fact that new
state resources were required for implementation.57  The state clearly
54 COASTAL SALMON INITIATIVE PROGRAM: THE OREGON PLAN (1997), available at http:
//www.oregon-plan.org/fmal.html.
SS Proposed Threatened Status for Three Contiguous ESUs of Coho Salmon Ranging
from Oregon Through Central California, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,011 (July 25, 1995) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227). The listing addressed the Oregon Coast Evolutionarily
Significant Unit (ESU), including coho salmon from Oregon coastal drainages between
Cape Blanco and the Columbia River. Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern
California Coast Evolutionary Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg.
24,588, 24,589 (May 6, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227).
-6 These agencies included the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Oregon
Economic Development Department, Oregon Department of Agriculture, Water
Resources Department, Department of Environmental Quality, Oregon Department of
Forestry, Oregon Department of Transportation, Oregon State Marine Board, Oregon
Parks and Recreation Department, and the Division of State Lands. Oregon Coastal
Salmon Restoration Initiative, Original Draft Plan, 1996; CHAPTER VI-A PART I,
Management Measures for State Agencies (by agency), available at http://www.oregon-
F71an.org/CHAP-6-A- 1 .html.
The Oregon budget for the biennium beginning July 1, 1997, provided approximately
$10 million to add sixty-three new technical staff to the state Departments of Agriculture,
Environmental Quality, Fish and Wildlife, Forestry, Water Resources, and Land
Conservation and Development. Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern
2001]
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would not be acting solely as a conduit for federal money or the
implementation of federal directives; under NMFS supervision, it would
be taking the initiative to propose and implement salmon enhancement
measures and would be responsible for the enforcement of these measures.
Oregon forwarded the OCSRI to NMFS in 1997, for consideration
in NMFS' decision regarding the listing of the coho salmon.5 8 NMFS
"welcomed adoption of the OCSRI by Oregon and believed it would
provide significant protections for Oregon Coast [Evolutionarily
Significant Unit of coho] in a number of areas," 59 especially with respect
to harvest and hatchery measures. NMFS was concerned, however, that
the habitat measures included in the OCSRI would not be sufficient to
ensure coho survival. Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with the Governor of Oregon, NMFS proposed to provide the state with
specific guidance on the measures that would be needed for habitat
protection.6 °
Based on the OCSRI, in conjunction with federal efforts, NMFS
concluded "the Oregon Coast coho is not likely to become endangered in
the interval between this decision and the adoption of improved habitat
measures by the State of Oregon. ',61 NMFS accordingly determined not to
list the Oregon Coast coho run as a threatened species, a decision that
"relie[d] heavily on continued implementation of the OCSRI (in
accordance with the MOA) .... , 62 NMFS proposed to review this listing
decision within three years.63
In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley,64 a federal district
court subsequently overruled NMFS' reliance on the OCSRI to support its
determination not to list the Oregon run.65 One basis for the court's
decision was the fact that NMFS had relied on a state plan that promised
to implement a new state regulation; the regulation had not, in fact, been
adopted at the time that NMFS made its listing determination.66 Because
such measures were speculative and could not provide assurances that the
California Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg.
24,588, 24,605 (May 6, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227).
58 id. at 24,603.
59 Id. at 24,605.
60 id.
61 62 Fed. Reg. 24,607 (May 6, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227).
62 Id. at 24,608.
63 id.
64 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998).
6 Id. at 1160-61.
66Id. at 1153.
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promised activities would be effective, if they were implemented at all, the
court concluded that "NMFS may only consider conservation efforts that
are currently operational, not those promised to be implemented in the
future. 67 The court then held that, "for the same reason that the Secretary
may not rely on future actions, he should not be able to rely on
unenforceable efforts. Absent some method of ensuring compliance,
protection of a species can never be assured. 68
If other courts follow this reasoning, the enforceability of state
promises will become an important issue in ESA listing decisions. It is an
issue that will reappear in various parts of the country over the next few
years. In Maine, for example, environmental and trout-fishing groups
have sued FWS and NMFS to have the Atlantic salmon listed under the
ESA.69 The lawsuits target the federal agencies' 1997 decision not to list
Atlantic salmon as a threatened species because the state-developed Maine
Atlantic Salmon Conservation Plan substantially reduced threats to the
species.70  The environmental groups, including Defenders of Wildlife,
sued first, stating that "the state plan holds a lot of promise to help in the
recovery of these fish. But it is not an adequate substitute for listing.' '71
Trout Unlimited held off from filing a similar suit, hoping that the state
would address its concerns that the Maine Plan did not adequately protect
salmon.72  When Trout Unlimited, together with the Atlantic Salmon
Foundation, finally decided to sue, they characterized their lawsuit as a
"last resort effort" based on frustration with "Maine's failure to adequately
fund the Plan," as well as "lack of enforcement and lack of
accountability.,
73
671 Id. at 1154.
6 Id. at 1155 (emphasis added). This ruling does not affect the importance of the state
role in regard to species that have been listed under the ESA. In fact, NMFS and the
State of Oregon withdrew their appeal of Daley in January, 1999. Oregon's governor
stated that he withdrew the appeal to avoid the possibility of a federal court ruling against
the state plan, because such a ruling would disrupt NMFS' plans to increase its reliance
on local efforts to restore salmon. Jonathan Brinckman, Oregon Abandons Fight with
US. over Coastal Coho, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 23, 1999, at 1.
69 See Orna Izakson, Agencies Face Suit Over Atlantic Salmon Listing, BANGOR (ie.)
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 28, 1999, available at 1999 WL 3287920.
70 Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to List a Distinct Population Segment of Atlantic Salmon
(Salmo Salmar) as Threatened, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,325, 66,337 (Dec. 18, 1997) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 17 and 425).
71 See Izakson, supra note 69.
72 id.
73 ATLANTIC SALMON AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS,
available at http://www.tu.org/articlelist.html?XP_PUB=pr&XPTABLE=articles.db
&XP_RECORD=199908122. Among the groups' specific complaints were the state's
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The Maine litigants may face mixed precedents. A California
federal district court recently refused to follow Daley when ruling on a
summary judgment motion that challenged FWS' decision not to list the
flat-tailed homed lizard as a threatened species. In Defenders of Wildlife
v. Babbitt,74 the court noted that the decision not to list the lizard was
based in part on the protections included in a federal-state Conservation
Agreement. 75 The court held that the reliance on the Conservation
Agreement was proper, stating that "[t]his court does not find Daley
persuasive. 76 The court found that the Conservation Plan was
"operational" because it had been executed a month before FWS withdrew
its decision not to list the lizard." Furthermore, it was the product of a
two-year process that made FWS' reliance on the plan "reasonably
foreseeable. '"78 The court added "it is irrelevant whether the conservation
agreement relied upon is mandatory or voluntary-as long as states
attempt to make continuing conservation efforts, they may be considered
by the FWS."'
79
The question of the importance of establishing that states will
actually implement their plans, rather than simply promising to take
species-protective measures, has arisen in various contexts outside the
issue of whether or not to list a species. In Texas, the Fifth Circuit
abstained from hearing a case under the ESA in deference to a state plan
that had not yet been implemented. 0 In California, FWS relied on a state
plan for habitat conservation in determining to list the California
gnatcatcher as threatened, rather than endangered.8 1 These programs are
discussed below.
failure to install fish weirs to prevent escaped aquaculture fish from entering rivers and
the state's refusal to ban the use of non-native strains of salmon on fish farms. Dieter
Bradbury, Fishing Groups Sue US. to List Salmon as Endangered; Trout Unlimited and
the Atlantic Salmon Federation Argue that Maine's Conservation Efforts Have Failed,
PORTLAND PRESS-HERALD (Me.), Aug. 13, 1999, at IA.
'4 No. 97-CV-2330 TW(LSP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366 (S. Dist. Cal. June 14,
1999).
" Id. at7.
16 id. at 22.
77 id.
78 Id. at 22 n.6.
7 9 Id. at 22.
go Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997), discussed infra, notes
171-182 and accompanying text.
81 See infra, notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
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B. ESA Provisions and Programs Affecting State Activities
1. Prohibition Against Take
The ESA defines states and state agencies as "persons,' '" 2 which
generally subjects the states to the ESA's blanket prohibition against the
"take" of endangered species. 83 The courts have found that the actions of
state entities can violate Section 9's prohibition against take.84 The take
prohibition encompasses significant habitat modification or degradation as
well as the direct killing, harming, or harassing of species. 85 Thus, if state
ownership or regulation of endangered species habitat causes an illegal
take of endangered species, whether through direct effects on species or
through significant habitat modification, the state could be found to have
violated Section 9.
Because the ESA is not a strict liability statute,8 6 the issue of state
causation of harm is important in determining the extent of potential
Section 9 liability. In finding that the Hawaii Department of Natural
Resources violated Section 9 by maintaining feral sheep and goats in the
endangered palila bird's critical habitat, the court cited both the agency's
82 The ESA provides as follows:
The term "person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust,
association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent,
department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State,
municipality, or political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign
government; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State;
or any entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994).
83 Section 9 of the ESA provides that "it is unlawful for any person" to "take" any
endangered species of fish or wildlife. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994).
84See, e.g., Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985 (1979),
ad, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
"[T]ake means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect ... ." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994). "Harm" is defined as "an act which actually
kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.. . ." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999).86 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 712
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675)
expressly removed the causation requirement, while the ESA retained the element of
proximate causation). See MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION
OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 215-16 (1998) (discussing Sweet Home's effort to define
proximate cause).
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acts (allowing the grazing to occur) and omissions (failing to remove the
feral sheep and goats) in finding a taking. 7
More recently, in Strahan v. Coxe, 8 the First Circuit held that
Massachusetts' commercial fishing regulatory scheme likely constituted a
taking of the endangered right whale. 89 Although the state defendants
argued that state licensure activity cannot be a "proximate cause" of a
taking,90 the court found that the licensing made it impossible for a
licensed commercial fishing operation to use gillnets or lobster pots
without risk of taking a right whale. 91 The court distinguished this
situation from other licensing schemes, such as the licensing of
automobiles whose drivers solicit or cause federal crimes.92 Car drivers
have to make a conscious and independent decision to violate federal law;
in contrast, the court reasoned, the fishing license specifically provided for
operations that are likely to result in a violation of federal law.93 The court
concluded that "[t]he causation here, while indirect, is not so removed that
it extends outside the realm of causation as it is understood in the common
law. 9
4
The precise state actions that would constitute a take under Section
9 will vary depending on the species and the program involved. The case
law to date indicates, however, that state programs that "take" species, as
well as state licensing programs that specifically allow activities that
"take" species, could lead to liability under Section 9. In order to avoid
such liability, states may take advantage of flexible ESA mechanisms
intended to meet the needs of species while also providing non-federal
parties with assurances about the extent of their species preservation
obligations.
87 Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw.
1979) ("The undisputed facts bring the acts and omissions of defendants clearly within
[the definitions of take]"), affid, 639 F.2d 495, 497-98 (1981) (observing further that
"[t]he Act requires the aflirmative preservation of an endangered species." Id. at 497
(citations omitted)).
8 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
9 Id. at 165-66.
90Id. at 163.
9' Id. at 164.
92 Id.
93 id.
94 127 F.3d at 164 (citation omitted).
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2. Flexible Methods of ESA Compliance: Habitat Conservation Plans,
Candidate Conservation Agreements, and Special Rules for Threatened
Species
a. Habitat Conservation Plans
Section 9's take prohibition, discussed in the previous section, can
paralyze states, private landowners, and other non-federal 95 parties, who
frequently cannot be sure in advance whether their planned activities will
or will not constitute a take. Habitat Conservation Plans constitute one
response to this problem. 96 The HCP process is governed by Section 10 of
the ESA, which authorizes the issuance of a permit allowing the taking of
listed species when the taking occurs incidentally during otherwise legal
activities.9 7 The taking must also comply with an approved conservation
plan, known as an HCP.98 Section 10 incidental take permits can be
issued to states, alone or in combination with federal, municipal, and tribal
entities, corporations, associations, private individuals, and planning
authorities such as watershed councils.
9
95 For federal agencies, Section 7 of the ESA establishes a consultation procedure that can
result in the issuance of an "incidental take statement," specifying the measures that the
agencies must take to protect species. This process allows federal activities to proceed
with a minimum of disruption and uncertainty. Under limited circumstances, states may
be able to "piggyback" onto a Section 7 permit. See Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th
Cir. 1996) (Oregon and Washington were not required to obtain Section 10 incidental
permits in order to issue regulations governing the harvest of salmon because an existing
Section 7 permit addressed incidental take under the regulations). But see Loggerhead
Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1245-1246 n.16 (1 1th Cir.,
1998) (stating that Section 7 incidental take statements only apply to applicants and
criticizing Ramsey as "unpersuasive").
96 See generally Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability:
Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L.
605 (1991) (discussing the background of the adoption of Section 10 of the ESA).
97 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994).
98 The HCP must show the impact that will likely result from the taking, the steps the
applicant will take to minimize and mitigate the impact, the availability of funding for
mitigation, alternatives to the action and why alternatives are not being pursued, and any
other measures deemed to be necessary or appropriate. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)
(1994). When all of these factors have been adequately addressed and FWS or NMFS
has also determined that "the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
survival and recovery of the species in the wild," the agency can issue an incidental take
permit. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(2)(B) (1994).
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES
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The use of HCPs escalated over the past decade, as the Clinton
administration emphasized their use to implement regional multi-species
planning efforts and as private landowners sought the certainty provided
by an incidental take permit. 00 States have been involved in many of the
HCPs prepared to date, particularly in regional plans involving multiple
species.' 0 States participate in HCPs as applicants because they are
landowners, as discussed above, 0 2 or because the state is a useful entity
for coordinating the efforts of many jurisdictions, groups, and private
landowners over a broad geographical scale. In Wisconsin, for example,
three forest products companies requested that the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources (DNR) lead a state-wide HCP for the Kamer blue
butterfly. DNR, which owns some--but not all--of the land affected by
the HCP, is the primary applicant and will be applying for the incidental
take permit. 0 3 Even when a state is not the applicant, the federal agencies
encourage applicants to invite and include state agencies that can use their
existing authorities, expertise, or land in support of HCP development and
implementation. 10
4
SERVICE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT
PROCESSING HANDBOOK [hereinafter HCP HANDBOOK] 3-1 (Nov. 4, 1996).100 See Jean 0. Melious & Robert D. Thornton, Contractual Ecosystem Management
under the Endangered Species Act: Can the Federal Government Make Enforceable
Commitments?, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 489, 499-501 (1999) (discussing the expanding use of
HCPs).
101 The HCP Handbook distinguishes "low-effect HCPs," involving minor or negligible
impacts on species, habitats, and other environmental values, and "regional or multi-
species conservation planning." HCP Handbook, supra note 99, at 1-8, 1-14. States tend
to be involved in larger HCPs, rather than low-effect HCPs. See, e.g., Sandra Crisman,
Florida Bald Eagle Habitat Conservation Plan, available at http://www.ncedr.org/
casestudies/hcp/eagle.htm; Jeff Opperman, Lantana Development's Habitat Conservation
Plan, available at http://www.ncedr.org/casestudies/hcp/lantan.htm, in NATIONAL
CENTER FOR DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH, IMPROVING INTEGRATED NATURAL
RESOURCE PLANNING: HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS (Oct. 14, 1998) available at
http://www.ncedr.org/casestudies/hcp.html (examples of HCPs that did not involve the
state because the areas or effects were relatively small).
102 See supra, text accompanying notes 22-30 (discussing state HCPs focusing on state
land management).
103 Sandra Crismon, Wisconsin's Karner Blue Butterfly Conservation Plan, available athttp://www.ncedr.org/casestudies/hcp/kamer.htmr, in NATIONAL CENTER FOR DECISION-
MAKING RESEARCH, IMPROVING INTEGRATED NATURAL RESOURCE PLANNING: HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANS (Oct. 14, 1998) available at http://www.ncedr.org/casestudies/
hcp.html.
104 HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at 3-8.
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State participation in HCPs, which cover an estimated 250
species, 10 5 is extremely important to private parties because of the
contractual nature of HCP implementation. HCPs frequently are
accompanied by implementing agreements (IAs), which are contracts
specifying all parties' obligations and establishing procedures for
amendment and enforcement of the HCP. 10 6 While FWS' Regional
Directors have discretion to determine whether an implementing
agreement should accompany an HCP, most regional or large-scale HCPs
that address significant portions of a species' range or that include
numerous activities or landowners involve negotiation of an implementing
agreement.1
0 7
An IA will generally define the obligations, benefits, rights,
authorities, liabilities, and privileges of all signatories and other parties to
the HCP; assign responsibility for planning, approving, and implementing
specific HCP measures; specify the responsibilities of state and federal
agencies in implementing and monitoring the HCP; provide for specific
measures to implement mitigation; establish a process for amendment of
the HCP; and provide for enforcement of HCP measures and for remedies
if parties fail to perform their obligations under the HCP.0's These
contracts govern relationships that may last for as long as 100 years. 10 9 IA
obligations may, and frequently do, involve the parties in complex
reciprocal obligations. States may agree to accept specified private
obligations in satisfaction of state legal requirements, for example, while
further agreeing to undertake other obligations in satisfaction of federal
obligations. In order to ensure that HCPs will continue to provide a useful
forum for multiple parties to work out their mutual, and reciprocal,
obligations under the ESA, it will be important to ensure that [As can be
enforced against the states.
105 Budget of the U.S. Govt., Fiscal Yr. 2000, p. 99.
'06 HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at 3-36 - 3-37.
107 Id. at 3-36.
108 Id.
'09 HCPs range in duration from seven months to perpetuity. THE NATURAL HERITAGE
INSTITUTE, COMPENDIUM OF EMPIRICAL REVIEWS AND SCHOLARLY ANALYSIS OF THE
EXPERIENCE WITH HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER SECTION 10 OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 7 n.45 (1998).
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b. Candidate Conservation Agreements
Candidate Conservation Agreements are intended to promote
efforts to preserve unlisted species."10  The goal of the policy is to
encourage non-federal landowners to take precautions that will avoid the
listing of the species. If non-federal property owners fulfill all of their
obligations under the agreement and the species is listed anyway,
however, the property owner would still be allowed to "take" the species,
or to modify habitat, up to levels specified by the permit.I I
In 1998, the federal government entered into forty Candidate
Conservation Agreements with private landowners or state and local
governments. 12 Non-federal parties' abilities to enforce state obligations
to protect species under these agreements may arise in the future.
c. Section 4(d) Rules for Threatened Species
All listed species do not receive the same protections under the
ESA. Section 9's "take" prohibition applies only to endangered, not to
threatened," 3 wildlife species. Section 4(d) of the ESA grants FWS and
NMFS the discretion to extend Section 9 protection to threatened
species.114 FWS has extended Section 9 protection to threatened species
by regulation." 5 To complicate matters, however, the regulation carves
out an exception to the applicability of the take prohibition when a
"special rule" has been adopted. l11 Special rules issued under this section
are known as 4(d) rules.
10 "[T]he targets of Candidate Conservation Agreements are proposed and candidate
species of fish, wildlife, and plants; species likely to become candidate species in the near
future may also be included." Draft Safe Harbor Policy and Candidate Conservation
Agreements Draft Policy, Notices; and Safe Harbor and Candidate Conservation
Agreements; Proposed Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,177, 32,185 (proposed June 12, 1997).
" Id. at 32,186.
112 Budget of the U.S. Govt., Fiscal Yr. 2000, p. 99.
13 "The term 'threatened species' means any species which is likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant part of its
range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1994).
114 "The Secretary may by regulation prohibit with respect to any threatened species any
act prohibited under section 1538(a)(1) . . . with respect to endangered species .... " 16
U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
115 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.3 1(a).
116 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.31(c). Special rules for mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fishes,
and crustaceans are found at 50 C.F.R. pts. 17.40-46.
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Although Section 4(d) was part of the ESA when it was enacted in
1973, the Department of the Interior has only recently begun to employ
4(d) rules frequently as a means of easing land use conflicts.1 7 While the
federal government could, in theory, use 4(d) rules to preempt state and
local land-use controls, it has instead used 4(d) rules to incorporate state or
local land-use mechanisms to protect species. An example of this is the
application of section 4(d) to the threatened coastal California
gnatcatcher. 119 The 4(d) rule first applies Section 9's take prohibition to
the gnatcatcher 20 and then provides an exemption for activities for the
incidental take of species resulting from activities conducted pursuant to
the State of California's Natural Community Conservation Planning Act
(NCCP).' 21 The NCCP requires the preparation of a "NCCP Plan," which
the 4(d) rule requires to meet the standards for approval of an HCP. 22
All of the 4(d) rules adopted to date for domestic species 23
prohibit take of the threatened species and then provide for specified
exemptions, generally determined by reference to state law. 124 NMFS has
17 Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private
Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 383 (1994).
"8 Tarlock, supra note 7, at 1351.
119 Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58
Fed. Reg. 65,088 (1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
120 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.41(b)(1).
12' 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.4 1(b)(2).
122 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.41(b)(2)(ii) provides that FWS "shall monitor the implementation of
the NCCP plan and may revoke its concurrence... if the NCCP plan, as implemented,
fails to adhere to the standards set forth in 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.32(b)(2)." The referenced
provision states the conditions under which an incidental take permit may be issued,
including requirements to minimize and mitigate the impacts of taking and to ensure that
the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild. 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.32(b)(2); see also supra text accompanying notes
31-53.
12 4(d) rules also cover nondomestic species such as primates (50 C.F.R. pt. 17.40(c))
and African elephants (50 C.F.R. pt. 17.40(c)).
124 See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.40 (g)(2) (Utah prairie dog may be taken on private land in
accordance with the laws of the state of Utah, subject to conditions limiting number and
time of takings); 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.41(b)(2) (incidental take of the coastal California
gnatcatcher will not be considered a violation of Section 9 if it results from activities
conducted pursuant to California NCCP); 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.42(a)(2)(ii) (any person may
take an American alligator in accordance with the laws and regulations of the state of
taking, subject to tagging and recordkeeping requirements); 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.42 (d)(1)-(2)
(blue-tailed mole skink and sand skink may be taken in accordance with applicable state
fish and wildlife conservation laws and regulations for conservation purposes); 50 C.F.R.
pt. 17.43 (a)(1)-(2) (San Marcos salamander may be taken in accordance with applicable
state law); 50 C.F.R. pts. 17.44(a)--(v) (fish species may be taken in accordance with
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also followed this general pattern in addressing the large-scale salmon
listings along the West Coast. This is demonstrated by its interim rule
governing the take of threatened coho salmon in southern Oregon and
northern California.125 NMFS first applied the prohibitions of Section 9.126
Reasoning that take "should not be prohibited when it results from a
specific subset of activities adequately regulated by federal, state, and
local governments," NMFS then specified exceptions to the take
prohibition, including the exception for incidental take contained in
Section 10 of the ESA, governing HCPs.127 Exceptions further included a
range of activities governed by state plans, including take of salmon in
Oregon through ocean and freshwater fishing and incidental take in
California through ocean fisheries, if conducted in accordance with the
OCSRI or another state plan approved by NMFS.128 Similarly, in its final
rule listing threatened species of chinook salmon in Washington and
Oregon, NMFS stated that it may issue 4(d) rules applying modified
Section 9 prohibitions "in light of the protections provided in a
conservation plan that is adequately protective."' 129 NMFS may
incorporate existing conservation plans into the 4(d) rules 30 and is
soliciting programs and proposals to include in its 4(d) rules for salmon
and steelhead species throughout the Pacific Northwest.'31
applicable state law, in some cases limited to conservation purposes); and 50 C.F.R. pt.
17.46 (a)(1) (Madison Cave isopod may be taken without federal permits provided that
all other federal, state or local laws have been complied with). Domestic species
regulated by standards other than state law include predators such as the grizzly bear (50
C.F.R. pt. 17.40 (b)), the gray wolf in Minnesota (50 C.F.R. pt. 17.40 (d)), the mountain
lion (50 C.F.R. pt. 17.40 (h)), and the Lousiana black bear (50 C.F.R. pt. 17.40 (i)), and
turtles (50 C.F.R. pts. 17.42 (b) [green sea turtle] and (f) [bog turtles]).
125 Interim Rule Governing Take of the Threatened Southern Oregon/Northern California
Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,479 (July
18, 1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 227.21-22).
126 Id. (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227.21(a)). NMFS has not adopted a regulation
extending Section 9 to threatened species; it makes this determination on a case-by-case
basis.
127 Id. (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227.21(b)(1)).
121 Id. at 38,479-80 (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227.22).
129 Endangered and Threatened Species: Threatened Status for Three Chinook Salmon
Evolutionarily Significant Units in Washington and Oregon, and Endangered Status of
One Chinook Salmon ESU in Washington, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308, 14,325 (Mar. 24, 1999)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223.102 and 224.101).130 ld.
131 See National Marine Fisheries Service, Northwest Region, The ESA and Local
Governments: Information on 4(d) Rules (May 7, 1999), available at http://www.nwr.
noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/4dguid2.htn.
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The use of 4(d) rules provides FWS and NMFS with considerable
flexibility in responding to the listing of threatened species. This
flexibility constitutes an inducement to the "greater use of threatened,
rather than endangered, status for listed species."' 32 This does not mean,
however, that Section 4(d) provides the agencies with a convenient way to
reduce the ESA's regulatory strictures through a standardless delegation of
their authority to the states. The ultimate backstop 33 for the preservation
of threatened species-and, perhaps, for endangered species as well-is
the ESA's conservation requirement. The ESA states that "the Secretary
shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to
provide for the conservation of such species."' 134 This specific provision
complements the ESA's broader statement of purposes, which include
providing "a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered and
threatened species depend may be conserved" and "a program for the
conservation of such endangered. and threatened species."' 15 The ESA
defines "conservation" as "the use of all methods and procedures which
are necessary to bring any endangered or threatened species to the point at
which the measures provided pursuant to [the ESA] are no longer
necessary."' 36 Although the duty to conserve has long been described as
"latent' ' 137  and characterized by "tremendous breadth but little
132 Meltz, supra note 117, 382-83, text accompanying nn.79-80.
133 "Backstop" is used to indicate a provision that could, in a worst-case scenario, require
the federal agencies to implement protective regulations for threatened species. To date,
this backstop has not been necessary because both FWS and NMFS have generally
approached 4(d) rules by applying Section 9 and then providing for exceptions. Because
the agencies are not required to apply Section 9, however, it is possible that future 4(d)
rules under a less ESA-sympathetic administration could attempt to provide lesser
protections for threatened species. The conservation obligation would remain as a
backstop under these circumstances.
It could be argued that ESA Section 4(f), which requires the federal agencies to
"develop and implement plans ... for the conservation and survival of ... threatened
species." (16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (1994)) would constitute another backstop. In practice,
however, most recovery plans have not been implemented to any significant extent. See
J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and
Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25
ENVTL. L. 1107, 1115, n.31-35 and accompanying text (1995).
134 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994) (emphasis added).
135 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994). The ESA further provides that it is "the policy of
Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
sfecies and threatened species .... ." Id. § 153 l(c)(1).
ir6 Id. § 1532(3).
137 Ruhl, supra note 133, at 1137; see also BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 86, at 236
(While the history of the conservation duty under Section 7 bears out the characterization
of the conservation duty of the ESA as "'the monumental underachiever of the ESA
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substance,' 38 it remains the only mandatory obligation for threatened
species preservation outside the Section 7 consultation requirement
pertaining to federal agencies. 139
By listing species as threatened, rather than endangered, FWS and
NMFS can promulgate special rules that, in effect, devolve ESA authority
to the states. To the extent that the state programs are implemented
through state, as well as federal, legislation, this may at least ensure that
state courts will have jurisdiction to enforce state obligations. If no
federal forum is available to enforce devolved ESA obligations, however,
some states may find that deferential state courts will be satisfied with the
appearance, rather than the actuality, of species protection. This
possibility emphasizes the importance of active federal oversight over
state ESA programs.
3. Cooperative Agreements
Section 6 of the ESA provides an explicit mechanism for state
participation in the ESA through cooperative agreements. FWS and
NMFS may enter into a cooperative agreement "with any State which
establishes and maintains an adequate and active program for the
conservation of endangered species and threatened species."' 40  The
statute establishes a number of conditions for cooperative agreements,
including a showing that "authority resides in the State agency to conserve
resident species of fish or wildlife" and "the State agency has established
acceptable conservation programs, consistent with the purposes and
policies of [the ESA]," for the species at issue.141 In practical terms, FWS
requires "passage of State legislation to enable one or more State agencies
family,"' it does not bear out the view that this duty "'has the potential to eclipse all other
ESA programs"' (quoting Ruhl, supra note 133, at 1128, 1110).
138 Ruhl, supra note 133, at 1112.
139 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994) requires federal agencies to consult with FWS and
NMFS to ensure that the agencies' activities are not likely to jeopardize endangered or
threatened species. Most commentators, and cases, have focused on the duty to conserve
as part of federal agencies' responsibilities under ESA Section 7. The obligation also
exists independently as a mandatory duty under Section 4. If the duty to conserve ever
shakes its image as a "monumental underachiever," Section 4, rather than Section 7, may
be responsible. The duty to conserve is the only mandatory duty protecting threatened
species in non-federal contexts, while the duty to avoid jeopardy also protects species
subject to Section 7 consultations.
140 Id. § 1535(b).
141 Id.
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to conduct conservation activities for listed and candidate plants and
animals" before entering into a cooperative agreement.' 4
2
When states enter into cooperative agreements, they become
eligible for funding through the Cooperative Endangered Species
Conservation Fund (Fund).' Grants may constitute up to seventy-five
percent of program costs, or nintey percent when two or more states enter
into a joint agreement.'" States may use grants for recovery activities,
such as population assessment and habitat restoration, for propagation and
reintroduction of listed species, for initiating conservation activities before
a species is listed, and for monitoring the status of recovered species. 145
Grants are also awarded to states for land actisition in partnership with
local governments and other interested parties.
The Fund is partially financed by permanent appropriations from
the General Fund, but the actual amount available for grants is subject to
annual appropriations. 147 In 1998, grants to states totaled $21 million, 14 1
while the 1999 estimated total is $14 million. 149 As of late 1996, thirty-
eight states and Puerto Rico had both plant and animal agreements, while
twelve states and two territories had agreements only pertaining to
animals. 50 While grants range from $1,000 to $235,000, the average
grant is $100,000. The president's fiscal year 2000 budget proposes to
supplement the Fund by a $66 million infusion from the Land and Water
142 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: A
SUMMARY OF THE ESA AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/esasum.html.
143 CATALOGUE OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE 15.615: COOPERATIVE ENDANGERED
SPECIES CONSERVATION Fund (Sept. 9, 1999) available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/cfda/
P15615.htm#i34.
'44 16 U.S.C. § 1535(d)(2) (1994).
145 CATALOGUE OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE, supra note 143. Funded projects
have ranged from activities relating to the reintroduction of the black-footed ferret to
cowbird control to protect the least Bell's vireo to American burying beetle surveys. Id.
14 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2000 [hereinafter
BUDGET FY 2000], APPENDIX, 567.
147 The permanent appropriation is an amount equal to five percent of receipts deposited
to the federal aid in wildlife and sport fish restoration accounts. Id.
148 Of the 1998 total, $8 million is specifically designated for "land acquisitionfHCPs."
Id. at 566.
149 Of the 1999 total, $6 million is specifically designated for "land acquisition/HCPs."
Id.
1
50 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: A
SUMMARY OF THE ESA AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/esasum.html.
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Conservation Fund.' 5' The budget attributes this funding increase to "the
Administration's commitment to making new tools available, and working
with states, tribes, local government and private partners."'' 5 2 From a legal
perspective, however, the cooperative agreement is an awkward tool for
federal/state partnerships because of the ESA's confusing treatment of
preemption. This issue is discussed in the next section.
4. Preemption
The ESA contains preemption provisions in Sections 6(0153 and
6(g)(2),154 governing cooperative agreements with the states, and in
Section 4(d), 155 governing the preservation of threatened species when
states have entered into cooperative agreements. Unfortunately, Section 6
and Section 4 do not mesh well together.
Section 6(f) provides that state law regulating the taking of an
endangered or threatened species "may be more restrictive than the
exemptions or permits provided for in this chapter or in any regulation
which implements this chapter but not less restrictive than the prohibitions
so defined."' 56 If this were the only provision governing preemption, the
law would be clear. Section 4(d), however, requires the promulgation of
regulations necessary for the conservation of threatened species and states
that "such regulations shall apply in any State which has entered into a
cooperative agreement pursuant to [Section 6(c)] only to the extent that
such regulations have also been adopted by such State."'
5 7
This provision appears, in theory, to allow states with cooperative
agreements to stymie federal regulations by refusing to adopt these
regulations. The state program would then be less protective than the
federal program. In practice, however, it is likely that this problem would
only arise if the federal government attempted to adopt new regulations
after entering into a cooperative agreement. When entering into new
151 BUDGET FY 2000 APPENDIX, 566. This is a substantial sum in ESA terms; the entire
1998 ESA program budget for both the Department of the Interior and the Department of
Commerce was $107 million. BUDGET FY 2000, 101 (Table 6-1).
152 BUDGET FY 2000, APPENDIX, 567. The budget also proposes an additional $100
million matching fund program for west coast salmon habitat restoration. BUDGET FY
2000, APPENDIX, 100.
113 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (1994).
' RId. § 1535(g)(2).
'5Id. § 1533(d).
116 Id. § 1535(f).
117 Id. § 1533(d).
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cooperative agreements, the federal government has the authority to
determine whether the state program is "adequate and active,"' 58 whether
the state agency has authority to conserve threatened and endangered
species,15 9 and whether the state agency has established "acceptable"
conservation authority, "consistent" with the ESA.16° If the state were to
refuse to adopt federal requirements, the cooperative agreement could
simply be denied.
Section 6(g)(2), which also applies to states with cooperative
agreements, presents a similar problem. This provision states that the
takings prohibition "shall not apply" to threatened or endangered
species within any state, except to the extent that the taking is contrary
to state law.' 62 Section 6(c) is captioned "Transition," and Congress may
have intended this provision to apply only during the initial
implementation of the Act. The law does not specify this limitation,
however, and the courts that have considered Section 6(g)(2) have not
viewed its application as limited by time restrictions.
The courts have limited Section 6(g)(2)'s apparent waiver,
however, by reviewing it in the context of the purposes of the ESA and
Section 6(f)'s preemption provision. In Swan View Coalition v. Turner,163
plaintiff environmental groups contended that the Forest Service had
allowed for road densities in the Flathead National Forest that modified
habitat of the grizzly bear. Under the federal definition of take, which
includes significant habitat modification, this would violate the ESA take
prohibition.'6 4 The Intermountain Forest Industry Association (IFIA), a
private party defendant in the case, argued that Montana law rather than
the federal definition of take was controlling in the case because Montana
was a party to a cooperative agreement. 65 Montana law does not define
take to include harm or significant habitat modification. 66
158 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1) (1994).
159 Id. § 1535(c)(1)(A).
'60 Id. § 1535(c)(1)(B).
161 Id. § 1535(g)(2). An exception is made for species listed in Appendix I to the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species or otherwise specifically
covered by any other treaty or federal law. Id.
16 2 Id.
163 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992).
'64Id. at 936.
165 Id. The federal defendants did not join IFIA in this claim. This is an example of a
situation in which the federal interest and the interests of a private party were not
identical, highlighting one of the shortcomings of reliance on the federal government to
enforce the ESA. See supra, text accompanying notes 4-17.
'66 824 F. Supp. at 938.
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The court observed that IFIA, which relied on Sections 4(d) and
6(g)(2), had raised "compelling arguments.' 67 Nonetheless, the court
held that the clear language of ESA Section 6(f), combined with "the
overwhelming priority Congress has given to the preservation of
threatened and endangered species," preempted the less-restrictive
Montana law. 168  A California district court that considered the same
argument in the same year simply concluded, without explaining its
reasoning, that the ESA preempts less-restrictive state law.1
69
While the ESA's inconsistent language continues to pose a threat
that less-restrictive state law may apply to states with cooperative
agreements, the courts to date have rejected this line of reasoning as
incompatible with the purposes of the ESA. Furthermore, when the
Department of the Interior enters into cooperative agreements, it generally
requires the states to acknowledge that the ESA will preempt any less-
restrictive state law.170 If the use of cooperative agreements increases and
states' sovereign immunity prevents direct enforcement against the states
under the ESA, it is some consolation that state law will generally be as
strict as the ESA.
This will not necessarily be the case in the Fifth Circuit, however,
where the Court of Appeals' decision to abstain from an ESA case in favor
of state law amounted to indirect preemption of the ESA. In Sierra Club
v. City of San Antonio,171 the Fifth Circuit dismissed an ESA case brought
by the Sierra Club in deference to Texas' adoption of a state program to
control and manage the use of the Edwards aquifer. The Sierra Club had
alleged that San Antonio and other public and private entities had taken
endangered and threatened species by withdrawing water from the
Edwards Aquifer. 72 The Fifth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction
issued by the district court, holding that the Sierra Club did not have a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits because federal court
abstention from the ESA lawsuit was "manifestly warranted"' 3 under
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.174
167 id.
168 id.
169 United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal.
1992).
170 BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 86, at 236.
17' 112 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997).
172 Id. at 792.
17 Id. at 793.
" 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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In Burford, a 1943 case, the Supreme Court had held that the
federal district court should have abstained from hearing an oil company's
suit against the Texas Railroad Commission to challenge the issuance of a
drilling permit. The Fifth Circuit found that state regulation of oil and state
regulation of water are similar. It viewed both as matters of great concern,
vital to the economy of the state. 175 Both are subject to comprehensive
state regulatory schemes; the Fifth Circuit noted that the Edwards Aquifer
Act "represents a sweeping effort by the Texas Legislature to regulate the
aquifer, with due regard for all competing demands for the aquifer's
water. ' 176 The court further emphasized that "both the aquifer and the
endangered species are entirely intrastate, which makes management of
the aquifer a matter of peculiar importance to the state.177
What the Fifth Circuit overlooked in applying "Burford immunity"
to the ESA was that Burford involved a situation in which "[t]he federal
government, for the present at least, has chosen to leave the principal
regulatory responsibility [for each oil and gas field] with the states ...
.,,8 The lawsuit in Burford was not based on federal question
jurisdiction, as in Sierra Club, but on diversity jurisdiction. In fact, the
Burford Court would not have abstained if jurisdiction in the case had
been based on a federal question, rather than focusing solely on Texas
state law. 179 The case was decided by a 5-4 split; Justice Douglas, in a
concurring opinion, emphasized that "[t]his decision is but an application
of the principle . . . that 'federal courts of equity should exercise their
discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence of
state governments in carrying out their domestic policy."' 80 Sierra Club,
in contrast, involved Texas' alleged refusal to carry out a policy contained
in federal law.
Sierra Club may be an anomaly that will be limited to the Fifth
Circuit, which recently stated-perhaps as a matter of wishful thinking-
that the ESA "does not apply to the states.' ' 81 Sierra Club emphasized
'Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 794.
116 I. at 794.
177 Id. The court did not reach the issue of whether applying the Endangered Species Act
under these circumstances is unconstitutional as a violation of the Commerce Clause. Id.
at n.17.
178 Burford, 319 U.S. at 319.
179 Id. at 334.
Iso Id. at 334-35 (emphasis added), quoting Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S 176, 185
(1935).
181 American Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1998).
Presumably, in the context of the case (see supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text),
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that the species at issue were only found in Texas, which appeared to have
influenced the court's conclusion that the state was the proper source of
power; this view conflicts with previous courts that have rejected
Commerce Clause challenges to the ESA.18 2 The court also emphasized
the advantages of the state scheme, which takes into account all competing
demands; the court clearly based its holding on its belief that the state's
water needs, rather than endangered species, were the proper regulatory
focus. 8 3 This approach contrasts with other courts that have held that the
ESA requires agencies to place species preservation above their other
responsibilities.
Sierra Club may provide an advance glimpse of the fate of ESA
enforcement efforts against states under the Supreme Court's current
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit declined to
implement the ESA despite the facts that the state scheme had not been
implemented and that the state law did not allow citizens' suits.'8 4 This
meant that once the case had been dismissed, the Sierra Club had
absolutely no recourse fbr its allegations of ESA violations. 8 5 The court
seemed unperturbed by these factors, finding simply that a state entity, the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, had authority to bring
suit and that was sufficient. 186 As the discussion of the Supreme Court's
Eleventh Amendment cases in Section III below, will show, the Supreme
Court has similarly turned a deaf ear to concerns that private parties with
legitimate concerns vested in federal law will find themselves without a
remedy.
C. Conclusion
Federalism under the ESA is evolving to include the states in ever-
expanding roles in species preservation. It does not seem desirable, or
even possible, to attempt to stop this trend; states have legitimate interests
the Fifth Circuit intended to say that Section 7 of the ESA does not impose consultation
requirements on state agencies.
182 See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating
that application of ESA prohibition against "take" to the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly
does not exceed Congress' Commerce Clause power). ); see also Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214
F.3d 483, 493 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001) (stating federal ESA
regulations protecting the endangered red fox on private land did not violate the
Commerce Clause).
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in their natural resources, and state resources and local knowledge are
crucial to the effort to preserve endangered and threatened species.
National species protection goals are unlikely to be achieved
without strong state involvement, including the ability of states to
experiment with alternative regulatory approaches. Conversely, the
development of adequate state programs frequently is a response to strong
federal environmental policies. In order to ensure that the national interest
in species preservation affects the states' equation of interests, the ESA
must continue to encourage states to take endangered species conservation
seriously. The structure of state programs, and of the federal-state
relationship under HCPs and cooperative agreements, can help to ensure
that the states do so. Unfortunately, the federal/state structure has
developed in an ad hoc fashion based on confusing and inconsistent
legislative language. While FWS and NMFS currently ensure
administratively that state programs will be consistent with the
requirements of the federal ESA, the law does not necessarily require such
protection-particularly with respect to threatened species, the category
that encompasses many of the large-scale, controversial listings of the past
decade.
Without a strong federal "hammer," some states may be tempted to
envelop endangered species concerns within broader natural resource and
economic development programs, and then to deny private parties the
right to enforce the state programs. The possibility that the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence will encourage this approach
is explored in the remainder of this article.
II. DUAL-LING SOVEREIGNS: CONGRESS, STATES, AND THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
A. The Supreme Court's Recent Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence
Just as states' roles in ESA implementation are expanding, the
Supreme Court has largely relieved states from the burden of defending
themselves from private actions brought under federal law. The Court is
effecting this change intentionally as part of its vision of "dual
sovereignty,"' 87 which emphasizes the expansion of state power at the
expense of the federal government.1
88
187 The Court observed at the beginning of the decade that the "Constitution establishes a
system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government." Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); see also David H. Rosenbloom & Bernard H. Ross,
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In its first blockbuster Eleventh Amendment case, Seminole Tribe
v. Florida,"9 the Court invoked state sovereign immunity to prevent a
damages lawsuit against a state from proceeding in federal court, despite
the fact that the suit was based on a federal question. The court held that
Congress may not, by adopting a federal statute, allow states to be sued (or
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity) when legislating
under pre-Eleventh Amendment constitutional powers, such as the
Commerce Clause.' g° More recently, in Alden v. Maine,191 the Supreme
Court extended states' sovereign immunity to lawsuits in state court,
holding that Congress does not have the constitutional authority to subject
nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state courts. Other
recent Supreme Court cases' 92 have further reduced the likelihood that
Toward a New Jurisprudence of Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court in the
1990s and Public Administration, 28 AM. REV. OF PUB. ADMIN. 107, 110 (June 1998)
("By the end of the 1980s, dual sovereignty seemed overwhelmed by cooperative
federalism .... [T]he 1990s have witnessed a dramatic shift. The Court sent a clear
message to the legal community... [that] [i]t wanted to rethink and perhaps reconstruct
constitutional federalism."). Seminole Tribe may be viewed as a case illustrating "the
importance that a narrow, but solid, five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court attaches
to the constitutional underpinnings of 'Our Federalism."' Henry Paul Monaghan, The
Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102 (1996). "'Our Federalism'
represents a system in which the national government seeks to vindicate and protect
federal rights and interests in ways that do not 'unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States."' Id. at 102, n.3 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45
(1971)). See generally Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
1295 (1997).
188 In addition to its Eleventh Amendment decisions, the Supreme Court has also
expanded state power through cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment (see New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997)), the
Commerce Clause (see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)), and the Due
Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment (see City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997)). For a discussion of subsequent environmental cases affected by these cases,
see Michael B. Gerrard, Emerging Statutory and Constitutional Tools for States to Resist
Federal Environmental Regulation, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,127 (Mar., 1998).
189 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
19 Although Seminole Tribe directly addresses the Indian Commerce Clause, it also
applies to the Interstate Commerce Clause, as made explicit by the fact that the Court
overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 63-64; see also infra, text accompanying notes 207-228.
'9' 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
192 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Coil. Say.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); see also
infra, text accompanying notes 228-256 (discussing the implications of these cases).
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private parties will find a loophole within the "rococo structure of rules
and exceptions that make up Eleventh Amendment doctrine."
1 93
A brief explanation of the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence barely needs to touch upon the actual text of the Eleventh
Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment states, in its entirety, that "[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."' 94 According to the Supreme Court, however, the text of
the Amendment is irrelevant. 95  Over a century ago, in Hans v.
Louisiana,196 the Court extended states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
to federal lawsuits brought by a state's own citizens-a concept not
included within the Amendment's text.' 97  The reasons for this,
subsequently referred to by the Court as "the Eleventh Amendment's twin
reasons for being,"' 98 included a desire to preserve states from the affront
193 Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling
of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO.
L.J. 1, 13 (1998).
194 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
195 The Seminole Tribe majority criticized the dissent for its "lengthy analysis of the text
of the Eleventh Amendment," charging that this fidelity to the language of the
Constitution "is directed at a straw man-we long have recognized that blind reliance
upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment is 'to strain the Constitution and the law to a
construction never imagined or dreamed of."' 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (citations omitted).
In Alden, the court asserted that "the bare text of the Amendment is not an exhaustive
description of the States' constitutional immunity from suit." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 736 (1999).
One federal judge has accurately described Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as
"a wonderland of judicially created and perpetuated fiction and paradox." Spicer v.
Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 235 (3rd Cir. 1980) (cited in Donald L. Boren, Suing a State in
Federal Court under a Private Cause of Action: An Eleventh Amendment Primer, 37
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 417, 418 n.2. (1984)). Other commentators have been less kind,
referring to the Eleventh Amendment as "an embarrassment to the United States'
aspiration to be a government of laws and not of men," Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is
Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685 (1997), resulting in a
"complicated jerry-built system that is fully understood only by those who specialize in
this difficult field." William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than
a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1044 (1983).
'6s 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
'9'Id. at 10.
'9 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994).
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to state sovereignty that would be created by lawsuits in federal courts' 99
and "the prevention of federal court judgments that must be paid out of a
State's treasury. ',200
This theme has been adopted, and expanded upon, over the course
of the past century. 20 1  The contemporary Court views fundamental
federalism as the basis of this extension of the Eleventh Amendment,
stating that the "presupposition" behind the Eleventh Amendment "has
two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system;
and second, that 'it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.'2°2
'"Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-18. Seminole Tribe also relies on the "indignity" that would be
suffered by a state if it were subjected to suit in federal court at the instance of private
parties. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58. This is not a universally accepted principle. As
one commentator has observed, "[t]he idea that a state, an utterly abstract entity, has
feelings about being sued by a private party when 'its' highest officials are regularly so
sued surely strains credulity." Monaghan, supra note 187, at 132.200 Hess, 513 U.S. at 48.
201 The development of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is ground that has been well
and thoroughly covered; "[t]here seem to be nearly as many accounts as there are legal
historians." Monaghan, supra note 187, at 103 n.12. Therefore, this article will only
summarize the current state of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence,
rather than revisiting its history. In waves of articles each decade over the past thirty
years, authors have attempted to show why Hans was incorrectly decided, and why the
Supreme Court should adopt a narrower view of state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. The result, as one commentator has observed, is that the anti-
Hans scholars have managed to convince almost everyone except the Supreme Court.
See Daniel J. Cloherty, Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment: Recognizing
the Assumption of State Court Availability in the Clear Statement Compromise, 82 CAL.
L. REv. 1287, 1301-02 (1994); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66-70 ("The dissent.
. disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review articles
and its own version of historical events."); Hess, 513 U.S. at 54 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been the subject of scholarly criticism.
And rightly so, for throughout the doctrine's history, it has clashed with the just principle
that there should be a remedy for every wrong.").
A partial list of some of the literature examining-and criticizing-the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence includes: RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 994-1105 (4th
ed. 1996); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987);
Boren, supra note 195; Donald L. Boren, Suits Against the States in Federal Court: The
Current Eleventh Amendment Controversy, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 701 (1988); Joanne C.
Brant, The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REv. 767 (1998); William
Burnham, "Beam Me Up, There's No Intelligent Life Here ": A Dialogue on the Eleventh
Amendment with Lawyers from Mars, 75 NEB. L. REV. 551 (1996); Vazquez, supra note
195; and Ned W. Waxman & David C. Christian II, Federal Powers After Seminole
Tribe: Constitutionally Bankrupt, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 467 (1999).
202 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1996).
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Because these general principles did not, in the past, immunize
states from the wide range of private lawsuits currently caught in the
Eleventh Amendment web, the Court has explicitly overruled two of its
own precedents. In Seminole Tribe, the Court overruled Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., which had held that Congress had the power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity through Commerce Clause regulation. 20 3 In
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board,20 4 the Court overruled Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co.,
20 5
which had held that a state's participation in a federally regulated business
constituted an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.2 6 It is important to
understand these cases, and to recognize the thoroughness with which the
Court has rejected their reasoning, because the two overruled cases
constituted important underpinnings of ESA enforcement against the
states.
In Union Gas, a precedent that was only seven years old when the
Court overruled it, the Court had rejected Pennsylvania's assertion that its
Eleventh Amendment immunity barred a private lawsuit brought under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA). 20 7 The Court first noted that it had already held that
Congress may override states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it
acts pursuant to the power granted under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but it must make its intent to do so "unmistakably clear.,
208
In examining whether Congress had the same power under Commerce
Clause legislation, such as CERCLA, the court first determined that
CERCLA clearly expresses Congress' intent to hold states liable for
damage.209 The Court emphasized that CERCLA includes states within its
definition of "persons"; 21° that states were explicitly made liable for
damages "to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any
non-governmental entity ''211 under specified circumstances; and that the
203 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989).
204 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
205 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
206 Id. at 196-98.
207 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
208 Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 7, (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 242 (1985)).209 Id. at 8.
210 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994)).
211 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1994)).
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statute used similar language to describe state liability to the language that
it used to waive federal liability.21 2
Four members of the Court joined Justice Brennan in this portion
213of the opinion. Justice Scalia, who agreed that CERCLA clearly
expressed Congress' intent to abrogate, dissented from the remainder of
the opinion.2 14 This portion of the case held that the Commerce Clause
granted Congress the authority to permit suits against states for money
damages.21 5 The plurality reasoned that the Commerce Clause, like the
Fourteenth Amendment, "with one hand gives power to Congress while,
with the other, it takes power away from the States. 216  It further
emphasized that, "in many situations, it is only money damages that will
carry out Congress' legitimate objectives under the Commerce Clause. 217
To support this conclusion, the court examined CERCLA's need to enlist
private parties to assist the federal government in its cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. "[T]he Government's resources being finite," the plurality
noted, "it could neither pay up front for all necessary cleanups nor
undertake many different projects at the same time. Some help was
needed, and Congress sought to encourage that help" by enlisting private
parties and allowing them to recover costs from other responsible
parties. 2 8 This reasoning resembles the federal logic of involving private
parties in HCPs: federal resources would not extend far enough to
accomplish all of the ESA's goals, and private efforts were needed in
order to achieve the federal goal of species and habitat protection.
Justice White, who dissented to the plurality's opinion that
CERCLA clearly expressed Congress' intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity,219 did agree with the plurality that Congress had the authority
under the Commerce Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity.220 He
did not join the plurality decision because he did not agree with "much of
222 Id. at 10 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(D), 9620(a)(1) (1994)).
213 The Justices included Justice Brennan, writing for the court, and Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia.
214 Justice Scalia was joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy.
221 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23.
226 Id. at 16.
217 Id. at 20.
218 ld. at 21.
219 Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice
Kennedy in the portion of the decision that dissented to the holding that CERCLA clearly
stated Congress' intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.20 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45.
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[Justice Brennan's] reasoning."221 This is all of the explanation that he
gives for writing separately.
The fractured Union Gas decision was vulnerable to a change in
the membership of the Court, which explains its rapid demise in Seminole
Tribe. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-Justice majority,
emphasized that "[tihe Court in Union Gas reached a result without an
expressed rationale agreed upon by a majority of the Court." 222 Declaring
that "[n]ever before the decision in Union Gas had we suggested that the
bounds of Article III [establishing federal court jurisdiction] 223 could be
expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitutional provision
other than the Fourteenth Amendment," 224 the court explicitly overruled
the case.2 25 The Court held that
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete
lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits
by private parties against unconsenting States. The
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article III, and Article I [establishing Congress' powers] 226
cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction. 227
A more venerable precedent was abandoned when College Savings
Bank held that "[w]hatever may remain of our decision in Parden is
expressly overruled. 228 Parden, a 1964 case, allowed employees of a
railroad owned and operated by Alabama to sue the state under the Federal
221 Id. at 57.
222 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996).
223 U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority."
224 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65.
m Id. at 66 ("Reconsidering the decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none of the
policies underlying stare decisis requires our continuing adherence to its holding ....
We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be,
and now is, overruled.").
226 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 enumerates Congress' powers, including the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes."
227 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
228 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680
(1999).
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Employers' Liability Act (FELA).229 The Parden Court found that the
state had impliedly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit by
its participation in federally regulated activity.23° The Court reasoned that
[I]t is within the power of Congress to condition a State's
permit to engage in the interstate transportation business on
a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity from suits
arising out of such business., Congress might well
determine that allowing a regulable conduct such as the
operation of a railroad to be undertaken by a body legally
immune from liability directly resulting from these
operations is so inimical to the purposes of its regulation
that the State must be put to the option of either foregoing
participation in the conduct or consenting to legal
responsibility for injury caused thereby. 231
The College Savings Bank majority232 described the "constructive-
waiver experiment of Parden" as "ill conceived. ' 233 Asserting that "[s]tate
sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by jury in criminal
cases, is constitutionally protected, 234 the Court held that only express,
not implied, waivers could waive such a constitutional right.235 The Court
also perceived that the Parden loophole could obliterate the Seminole rule.
Recognizing a congressional power to exact constructive
waivers of sovereign immunity through the exercise of
Article I powers would also, as a practical matter, permit
Congress to circumvent the anti-abrogation holding of
Seminole Tribe. Forced waiver and abrogation are not even
different sides of the same coin-they are the same side of
the same coin.236
229 Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
230 Id. at 196-98.
23! Id. at 198.
232 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in College Savings Bank, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Breyer, joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, wrote a dissenting opinion that objected
strenuously to this holding. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 692-705.
233 Id. at 680.
234 Id. at 682.
35 Id. at 681-82.
236 Id. at 683.
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As a practical matter, the theory of constructive waiver through
participation in federal programs did not shield states from Congress'
attempts to impose liability through federal legislation. To adherents of
dual sovereignty, this was the fatal flaw in the system.
The Court's decisions.in Seminole Tribe and College Savings Bank
establish that Commerce Clause legislation cannot be enforced against the
states for damages in federal court. Congress cannot abrogate states'
sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause, nor can federal
legislation be interpreted to require a constructive waiver of state
sovereign immunity when states participate in federally regulated
programs. Undeterred either by the text of the Eleventh Amendment or its
own past precedent, the Court has given more weight to the dignity of the
states than to the right of the states' citizens to seek recourse for violations
of legal obligations.
B. The Ex parte Young Exception
The Court has not, however, eliminated an exception to sovereign
immunity for lawsuits seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief
in order to end a continuing violation of federal law.237 This exception,
known as the Ex parte Young 38 doctrine, applies to lawsuits in federal
court brought against state officers in their individual capacities.239 Under
the doctrine, conduct in violation of federal law strips state officials of
their official or representative character and subjects them to the
consequences of their individual conduct.
240
When Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas, the court emphasized
that its holding would not eliminate "other methods of ensuring the States'
compliance with federal law,' 241 including the Ex parte Young exception.
In both Seminole Tribe and a subsequent case, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe,242 however, the Court has limited the scope of the Ex parte Young
exception. Seminole Tribe held that Ex parte Young could not be applied
to the Tribe's lawsuit against the Governor of Florida because the federal
statute at issue created a "detailed remedial scheme" for enforcement
against a state. 243 The availability of an Ex parte Young action, the Court
237 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996).
23' 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
'39 See id. at 155-56.
240 Id. at 159-60.
241 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14.
242 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
243 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74.
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reasoned, would supplant the statutory remedy for a judicially created
remedy.24
4
In Coeur d'Alene, the Court addressed the issue of whether the
Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from hearing the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe's claim that the Tribe, not the state of Idaho, owned the
banks and submerged lands of Lake Coeur d'Alene. 45 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had found that the Eleventh Amendment
barred all of the Tribe's claims against the state, but that the Ex parte
Young doctrine allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief to
proceed against state officials. 24
6
Although the Court launched its analysis by reiterating that it did
not "question the continuing validity of the Ex parte Young doctrine, 247 it
did stress that it would exercise strict oversight over the use of the
doctrine.248 Writing for the Court,249 Justice Kennedy emphasized that the
fictional distinction between the state and its officers 50 should not be used
to make the doctrine of sovereign immunity less "meaningful. 2 5 '
"Application of the [Ex parte] Young exception must reflect a proper
understanding of its role in our federal system and a resj2ect for state
courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious fiction. ' 2
The Court then turned to the Tribe's request for prospective
injunctive relief to remedy the State's alleged violation of the Tribe's
property rights, in contravention of federal law. The Court admitted that
an "allegation of an on-going violation of federal law where the requested
relief is prospective" would "ordinarily" invoke the Ex parte Young
244 Id. at 75-76.
245 Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 264.
246 Id. at 266.
247 Id. at 269.
248 Id.
249 Like all of the recent Eleventh Amendment cases, Coeur d'Alene is a fractured
opinion. The case was a 5-4 decision, with the majority consisting of Justice Kennedy
joined (in part) by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the part of Justice Kennedy's opinion that was
most restrictive of the Ex parte Young doctrine. Id. at 27081. Justice O'Connor, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 288-98. Justice Souter wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 298-319.
250 Id. at 269 ("When suit is commenced against state officials, even if they are named
and served as individuals, the State itself will have a continuing interest in the litigation.
This commonsense observation of the State's real interest when its officers are named as
individuals has not escaped notice or comment from this Court.").
251 Id.
252 Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 270.
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"fiction."2" 3  The Court majority found the "far-reaching and invasive
relief' sought by the Tribe to be "troubling," however, and worried that
the suit would cause "offense to Idaho's sovereign authority and its
standing in the Union."
254
In order to avoid applying Ex parte Young to a case that it found so
abhorrent, the Court created its own" fiction. It found that "the declaratory
and injunctive relief the Tribe seeks is close to the functional equivalent of
quiet title"255 that would shift the benefits of ownership and control from
the State to the Tribe. Such an action would affect
Idaho's sovereign interests in its lands and waters... in a
degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable
retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury. Under these
particular and special circumstances, we find the Young
exception inapplicable. The dignity and status of its
statehood allow Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
256
The Court's concern for the inviolability of state sovereignty over
state resources may be limited to non-state ownership of navigable waters,
the issue directly at stake in Coeur d'Alene. The Court could express,
however, equal concern for the locus of control over state-owned
resources, particularly in light of the Court's extreme deference to the
dignity of the states as sovereigns. If the Court were to extend its
reasoning in Coeur d'Alene to immunize state control over water and
other state-owned resources, its reluctance to apply Ex parte Young could
have important implications for enforcement of the ESA.
C. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has erected an impressive set of hurdles for
private parties who seek redress of state violations of federal law. These
hurdles will apply to private parties seeking to enforce state obligations
under the ESA. Although past cases have allowed private parties to sue
states in federal court, Seminole Tribe and its progeny have forced private
parties to focus on seeking only prospective injunctive relief against
253 Id. at 281.
254 Id. at 282.
255 id.
2 56 Id. 287-88.
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federal officials under the volatile, ill-defined Ex parte Young exception.
The following section discusses the history and current status of ESA
cases that address the issue of state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.
IV. ESA JURISPRUDENCE ADDRESSING STATES' ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
IMMUNITY
A. Federal Jurisdiction Under the ESA
The ESA vests judicial review exclusively in federal courts,
providing that the "district courts of the United States . . shall have
jurisdiction over any actions arising under this [Act]." '257 The right of
private parties to enforce the ESA is established by the citizen suit
provision, which states that
Any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf-
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and
any other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the
extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this [Act].258
This provision, which has been part of the ESA since its adoption
in 1973, clearly contemplates broad citizen enforcement of the Act,
tempered by Eleventh Amendment constraints. It is not surprising,
therefore, that state defendants to ESA lawsuits raised Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity issues even before the Supreme Court
started to focus on this defense as a way to expand state power.
Even before the ESA was adopted, the Eleventh Amendment was
raised as a defense to a lawsuit claiming violation of a state's obligation to
protect endangered species. In National Audubon Society, Inc. v.
Johnson,259 a 1970 case, Audubon asserted that the Texas State Parks and
Wildlife Commission harmed wildlife resources when it authorized the
dredging of bays for shell.26°  In particular, dredging destroyed "the
27 16 U.S.C. § 1540(c) (1994).
258 Id. at § 1540(g)(1)(A).
259 317 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
260Id. at 1332.
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natural food for the famous whooping crane, an almost extinct variety of
bird.",261 The lawsuit was based on state law, the Rare and Endangered
Species Act of 1958, a predecessor to the ESA, and the Migratory Bird
Treaty between the United States and Great Britain.
262
Audubon sued named state officials, who all asserted Eleventh
Amendment immunity.263 Without referring to Ex parte Young by name,
Audubon attempted to invoke the Ex parte Young exception to the
Eleventh Amendment for state officers whose unlawful activities are
viewed as occurring outside their official capacities. 26 The court refused
to allow the suit against the defendants in their individual capacities to go
forward, however, finding -that the members of the Parks and Wildlife
Commission had not "so clearly acted beyond their official duties that I
must enjoin their actions."265 It dismissed the case as to all defendants,
holding that the state of Texas was a necessary party that was immune to
suit.
266
The court viewed the Exparte Young doctrine as an exception that
could only be applied after reviewing the case on the merits.267  The
court's reluctance to allow the lawsuit to proceed was also influenced by
the availability of state court review, since state law as well as federal law
formed the basis of Audubon's suit.
26s
B. Palila: ESA at its Pinnacle, Eleventh Amendment at its Nadir
Most ESA practitioners are familiar with the Palila cases,
2 69
named after a Hawaiian bird, as interpreting the scope of the ESA's
261 id.
262 Id. at 1333 (referring to Convention between the' United States and Great Britian for
the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702).
263 Id.
264Id.
265 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Johnson, 317 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
266 id.
2671d. at 1333-34.
268 Id. at 1334. The court noted that "[i]f, in fact, there has been some indiscretion in the
issuance of the permits [required by state law], then this is a proper matter for the State
Courts to decide, even to reaching the point of the constitutionality of their acts." Id.
269 There are two sets of Palla cases, sometimes referred to as "Palila I" and "Palila II."
The first set of Patila cases, which addressed the impacts of feral sheep and goats, also
required the district court to consider a broad range of attacks on the ESA. Palila v.
Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 992-1000 (D. Haw. 1979),
aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). 'The second set of cases focused on the issue of
whether mouflon sheep "harmed" the Palila under the ESA. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of
Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1078-80 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106
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prohibition of "harm" and its applicability to habitat modification.27 ° The
first Palla case also addressed fundamental issues relating to the
enforceability2 71 of the ESA, however, including the most in-depth
consideration of Eleventh Amendment issues to date.
The Palila parties did not raise the Eleventh Amendment as a
defense; the court considered it on its own initiative.272 The court first
determined that the Ex parte Young doctrine applied to the state officials
named in the suit, reasoning that the relief requested by the plaintiffs could
be interpreted as prospective equitable relief.273  The court observed,
however, that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a suit against the state
itself "where Congress has clearly manifested its intent to abrogate





The court then focused on the ESA's citizen suit provision, finding
that Congress had intended to abrogate state immunity when it allowed
private citizens to bring suit enjoining "'the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution).",2 7 5 The court asserted that the
statute's reference to the Eleventh Amendment did not "mitigate the
force" of the provision, but that the reference "is most sensibly construed"
as limiting the scope of injunctive relief against the state, so as to bar
276forms of equitable relief that would be tantamount to money damages.
To interpret the Eleventh Amendment as creating a blanket sovereign
immunity exception to private enforcement of the ESA, the court
observed, would "seriously impair the achievement of the broad
(9th Cir. 1988). The discussion in this section focuses on the District Court's decision in
Paia I.
270 See generally Palila, 471 F. Supp. 985.
271 In addition to the Eleventh Amendment argument discussed here, Hawaii raised a
Tenth Amendment defense, claiming exclusive state sovereignty over the Palila. Id. at
992. The court held, however, that both the treaty origins of the ESA and the Commerce
Clause supported the federal government's right to protect "any endangered species
anywhere." Id. at 993-95.
272 Id. at 995-96.
273 Plaintiffs asked the Court to "'enjoin the defendants from continuing to maintain any
population of feral goats and sheep within the Palila's critical habitat . . .' and compel
defendants to prepare and implement a plan for complete and permanent removal of these
feral animals." Id. at 996 n.42.
274 Id. at 996.
275 Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 997 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994)).
276 id.
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congressional purposes underlying the Act and would lead to a right
without an effective remedy." 2
77
This analysis is not in line with current Supreme Court Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. The Court now views the Eleventh
Amendment as embodying the states' inherent sovereignty. It would be
unlikely to uphold the Palila court's rather cavalier dismissal of the ESA's
explicit recognition that citizen suit authority might be limited by Eleventh
Amendment immunity.278 Nor would the Court be likely to share Palila's
concern that Eleventh Amendment immunity could unacceptably diminish
the role of citizen enforcement. The Court majority has been notably
unimpressed by its own dissenters' arguments that broad Eleventh
Amendment immunity would leave citizens without a remedy. In
Seminole Tribe, for example, the Court majority pointed out that the
federal government could always sue states to enforce environmental laws,
even if citizens were prevented from doing so. 279  Similarly, the ESA
would not be unenforceable if citizens were barred from enforcement
actions; the federal government would still have the authority to sue
states. 28 The Palila court recognized that this possibility could affect the
analysis of citizens' rights, but dismissed it on the grounds that "it is
277 Id. (footnote omitted).
278 See also infra text accompanying notes 305-340 (discussing recent cases decided
under other environmental statutes, holding that the phrase "extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution" (42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (2001)) does not
abrogate state immunity). But see Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 166 (1997) ("The
very fact that Congress has limited its authorization to suits allowed by the Eleventh
Amendment reinforces the conclusion that Congress clearly envisioned that a citizen
could seek an injunction against a State's violations of the ESA."); F.J. "Rick"
Dindinger II, Seminole Tribe's Impact on the Ability of Private Plaintiffs to Bring
Environmental Suits Against States in Federal Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 253, 261-62
(1997) (concluding, without discussing the significance of its reference to the Eleventh
Amendment, that the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision shows Congress' intent to
abrogate state sovereign immunity).
279 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) ("[The dissent's]
argument wholly disregards other methods of ensuring the States' compliance with
federal law: The Federal Government can bring suit in federal court against a State.").
280 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(1) (1994)
The provisions of this [Act] and any regulations or permits issued
pursuant thereto shall be enforced by the Secretary [of the Interior or
the Secretary of Commerce], the Secretary of the Treasury, or the
Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, or
all such Secretaries. Each such Secretary may utilize by agreement,
with or without reimbursement, the personnel, services, and facilities of
any other Federal agency of any State agency for purposes of enforcing
this [Act].
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evident from the language of the Act that private suits are of paramount
importance in enforcing the Act."281  The current Supreme Court, in
contrast, views citizens' suits under the ESA with a more jaundiced eye, as
evidenced by its decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife28 2 to restrict the
standing of citizens to sue under the ESA.
The first prong of Palila's Eleventh Amendment analysis is
therefore suspect, in light of the current Supreme Court's view both of the
Eleventh Amendment and of the ESA. The second prong of Palila's
analysis has been overruled outright. When Congress has legislatively
abrogated sovereign immunity, a state's waiver of immunity and consent
to be sued will be implied from its participation in activities covered by
federal legislation.283 The state of Hawaii had actively participated in the
ESA's cooperative agreement provisions. 284 As part of this program, the
state passed its own law, the Hawaii Endangered Species Act.285 "Having
bound itself under its own law to refrain from 'taking' federally-
designated endangered species, having sought to secure financial
advantages under the Endangered Species Act, and having sought to retain
managerial control over resident wildlife," the court held that Hawaii had
impliedly consented to suit under the ESA.286
If this doctrine were still good law, it would form an attractive
solution to Eleventh Amendment problems under the ESA. Unfortunately,
the Palila court relied heavily on Parden v. Terminal R. Co, 287 which the
Supreme Court explicitly overruled in College Savings Bank.288 The
doctrine of applied consent to waiver can no longer be applied to states
acting to implement the ESA. In fact, because Palila's analysis of the
Eleventh Amendment relied so heavily on doctrines that the Supreme
Court has explicitly discredited, it actually supports the view that Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity will shield states sued under the ESA.
281 Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 997 n.51.
282 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Lujan held, inter alia, that persons who were not "perceptibly
affected" by harm to an ecosystem could not show the degree of injury required for
standing under the ESA. Id. at 566.
283 Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 997.
284 Id. at 998 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1535); see also supra text accompanying notes 130-140.
285 Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 195D-1 to 195D-31 (LEXIS through 2000 2d Special Session).
286 Palla, 471 F. Supp. at 999.
287 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
288 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2228 (1999); see also supra, text accompanying notes 228-236.
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C. Applying the Ex parte Young Exception to the ESA After Seminole
Tribe: Strahan v. Coxe
In Strahan v. Coxe,289  the First Circuit addressed the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts' claim of Eleventh Amendment
immunity to an ESA suit that postdated 29° Seminole Tribe. The plaintiff, a
member of the conservation organization Green World, contended that
Massachusetts' regulation of commercial fishing violated the ESA by
harming endangered northern right whales.291 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's claims.292 It then fashioned a
remedy that required Massachusetts to "prepare a proposal.., to restrict,
modify or eliminate the use of fixed-fishing gear in coastal waters of
Massachusetts ... in order to minimize the likelihood additional whales
will actually be harmed by such gear.' 293 Although Massachusetts moved
to dismiss the case on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the district court
held that it had jurisdiction under the Ex parte Young 294 exception for
prospective injunctive relief against state officials.
On appeal, Massachusetts contended that its Eleventh Amendment
immunity prevented the court from requiring it to implement regulations
that would provide greater protection to northern right whales.295 This
argument was based on the nature of the relief granted, not whether the Ex
parte Young exception applied to the suit.2 96 Massachusetts argued that,
although the district court could have ordered an injunction barring all
Commonwealth licensing activity, it could not require specific types of
future regulatory measures. 297 The court rejected this argument, finding
that the Ex parte Young exception only limits federal courts' jurisdiction
to hear a case. If a case requests prospective injunctive relief against state
289 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
290 Seminole Tribe was decided after initial briefing in the District Court but before the
District Court ruled on the case. See Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 980 (D. Mass.
1996) ("Emboldened by the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Seminole Tribe . ..,
defendants have mounted a reinvigorated argument, only lightly developed in the initial
briefing on these motions, that the Eleventh Amendment bars any and all of Strahan's
claims against the Commonwealth under the ESA.").
291 See Strahan, 939 F. Supp. at 963.
292 See id.
293 Id. at 990.
294 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See supra, text accompanying notes 218-235.
295 Strahan, 127 F.3d at 166. Massachusetts also raised the Tenth Amendment and the




WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
officials, the court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine does not place
limits on the scope of the equitable relief that may be granted.298
D. Conclusion
Before the Supreme Court's recent series of Eleventh Amendment
decisions, Palila provided a strong basis for assuming that states did not
have Eleventh Amendment immunity against suit under the ESA. Palila
emphasized the importance of citizen suits to the statutory scheme; it also
held that states impliedly waive their sovereign immunity to suit when
they participate in federal schemes.299 The deference to citizens' suits is
suspect under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, while the
doctrine of implied waiver has been explicitly overruled. Therefore,
Palila's analysis and holding do not reflect the current state of the law.
As Strahan indicates, suing state officials for prospective
injunctive relief under the Ex parte Young exception provides one possible
means of enforcing state roles under the ESA. 3 0 Even assuming that the
Supreme Court did not, and will not, narrow the scope of this exception
substantially, however, the Ex parte Young exception will not address all
of the problems of potential litigants. The following section discusses the
future role of Ex parte Young and of other possible approaches to ESA
enforcement actions against the states.
V. LIVING WITH THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: How WILL THE ESA BE
ENFORCED AGAINST THE STATES?
A. Introduction
As states increasingly demand, and are delegated, authority under
the ESA, the issue of enforcement must emerge as an important
consideration in the assignment of responsibilities under the law. If states
take on duties that simply cannot be enforced because of their Eleventh
Amendment immunity, the ESA's "teeth" may develop significant gaps.
Based on the Supreme Court's recent cases and the emerging
jurisprudence developing in District and Circuit Courts, the following
298 Id. at 167.
299 Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 992-1000 (D. Haw.
1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
300 Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 980 (D. Mass. 1996).
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discussion addresses some of the constraints on, and opportunities
available to, parties seeking to enforce states' ESA obligations.
B. Avoiding the Eleventh Amendment? Non-Commerce Clause Bases of
the Congressional Power to Adopt the ESA
1. Threshold Issue: Clear Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity
In National Ass "n of Home Builders v. Babbitt,30 1 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ESA as a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.30 2 This was good news
for the delhi sands flower-loving fly, which was the subject of the case,
but this good news does not make the issue of Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity any easier for the federal ESA agencies. As the
Supreme Court has made clear, Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity through legislation adopted under the Commerce Clause.
Therefore, as an exercise of the commerce clause, the ESA appears
susceptible to state Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defenses.
This determination alone, however, does not necessarily toll the
death knell for congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity in
the ESA. If another basis of congressional authority could be cited that
formed an "appropriate" grant of power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, it still might be possible to argue that states are susceptible to
suit under the ESA. To date, the court has identified only one appropriate
grant of power: the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 3 The following sections
discuss the Fourteenth Amendment as a possible basis for the adoption of
the ESA and also analyze the treaty power as a possible basis for
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Before reaching the issue of an appropriate grant of power for
abrogation, however, a threshold issue must be addressed: did Congress
clearly express its intent to abrogate? 3°4 As discussed above, Palila held
that Congress had intended to abrogate state immunity when it allowed
private citizens to bring ESA lawsuits enjoining "the United States and
any other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) .... ,305
30 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
302 Id. at 1043.
303 See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
304 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
305 Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 997 (D. Haw. 1979)
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)).
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This interpretation of the ESA's citizen suit language is
increasingly suspect, however, and courts examining other environmental
laws with similar citizens' suit provisions have rejected it. The Second
Circuit, for example, recently held that the exact same language contained
in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) does not
abrogate state sovereign immunity.30 6  The court held that "[t]hese
provisions do not unequivocally express Congress's intent to abrogate
sovereign immunity and subject states to suit. Far from evidencing a
congressional intent to do away with sovereign immunity, these provisions
are expressly limited by the Eleventh Amendment." 30 7 The Sixth Circuit
has also upheld a case that found that, "by its very terms," RCRA
"operates within the Eleventh Amendment." 30 8
Based on the logic of these cases, the ESA probably does not meet
the threshold requirement of clear Congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. Even if the courts followed Palila rather than the
RCRA cases, however, the likelihood that an appropriate grant of power
would support this abrogation is slim, as discussed below.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
In an effort to defend the ESA against state sovereign immunity, it
has been suggested that it is possible to argue that Congress adopted the
ESA under the Fourteenth Amendment. 309  This argument requires a
finding that the ESA falls under the Equal Protection Clause because all
citizens should enjoy the protection of environmental laws.3 10 As one
court observed in addressing states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to the
Clean Water Act, however, the Supreme Court's opinion in Boerne v.
Flores3 '
clarified the substantive scope of Congress' power under
the Fourteenth Amendment in such a way that litigation
strategies of this type are likely to fail .... 'The teaching of
Boerne is that there must be a substantial constitutional
hook: the principal object of the legislation must be to
306 Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 1999).
307 Id. at 57.
308 Rowlands v. Pointe Mouillee Shooting Club, 959 F. Supp. 422, 426 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
af d, 182 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 1999).
3 See Dindinger II, supra note 278, at 265.
310 id.
311 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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address rights that are judicially recognized [as prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment.]' 31
2
It is unlikely that courts will find that the "principal object" of the
ESA is to implement equal protection under the laws. Therefore, efforts to
rely on the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for the adoption of the ESA
probably would fail.
3. Treaty Jurisdiction
In addition to its grounding in the Commerce Clause,313 the ESA
is explicitly based on the United States' treaty obligations. 314 Although
many of these treaties are limited in scope, addressing only a few species,
the Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the
Western Hemisphere31 5 (Western Convention) establishes a broader
obligation. Under the Western Convention, the United States has a treaty
obligation to provide "strict protection" for "living species of flora and
fauna of aesthetic, historic or scientific interest."316 Such species are to
be protected by setting them aside as "nature monuments," which are to
be "inviolate ... except for duly authorized scientific investigations or
312 Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 851 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (citation omitted).
313 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(upheld application of the ESA's prohibition against "take," as applied to a listed fly
species, as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause).3 4 These treaties include "migratory bird treaties with Canada and Mexico; the Migratory
and Endangered Bird Treaty with Japan; the Convention on Nature Protection and
Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere; the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries; the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of
the North Pacific Ocean; [and] the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora." 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 (a)(4)(A)-(F) (1999).
31 56 Stat. 1354, 161 U.N.T.S. 229 (opened for signature Oct. 12, 1940) [hereinafter
Western Convention]. See generally Gavin R. Villareal, One Leg to Stand On: The
Treaty Party and Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United
States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1125 (1998); Kathleen Rogers & Dr. James A. Moore,
Revitalizing the Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the
Western Hemisphere: Might Awakening a Visionary but "Sleeping" Treaty Be the Key to
Preserving Biodiversity and Threatened Natural Areas in the Americas?, 36 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 465 (1995).
316 Western Convention, supra note 315, at art. I § 3.
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government inspection." '317 The ESA is the United States' implementing
statute for this treaty obligation.318
This treaty obligation might appear to provide the federal courts
with an independent basis for ESA jurisdiction. Under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, treaties, along with the
Constitution and federal law, comprise "the supreme Law of the
Land.",319 Under international law, nations may not invoke the provisions
of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.320 If
treaties constitute the supreme law of the land, which must be
implemented regardless of conflicting domestic law, it might appear to
follow that the United States' treaty obligation to protect endangered
species could be enforced against the states regardless of issues of
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Supreme Court has responded to such reasoning, however, by
applying the same precepts that it applied to other Eleventh Amendment
lawsuits. "Behind the words" of constitutional provisions, the Court has
noted, "are postulates which limit and control."' 21 One such postulate is
that "States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall
be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been a
'surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention." 322 In the
3 17 id.
318 The ESA designates the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of State as the
United States' representatives to the Western Convention. 16 U.S.C. § 1537a(e) (1999).319 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
320 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 27., 8 I.L.M.
679. The United States is one of a very few states (other examples include Afghanistan,
Bolivia, and Luxembourg) that are not parties to the Vienna Convention. See
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES AND RESOURCE INDICATORS (ENTRI) TREATY SELECTION,
available at http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/viennaconvention.html. Nonetheless, the
United States has acknowledged that the Vienna Convention codifies customary law and
may be binding even on nonparties. See, e.g., Luke T. Lee, The Law of the Sea
Convention and Third States, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 553-54 (1983) (observing that
while the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, the Department of State, in its Letter of Submittal to
the President, stated that 'although not yet in force, the Convention is
already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty
law and practice.' ... [The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States (Revised) [accepts] the Convention 'as
presumptively codifying the customary international law governing
international agreements, and therefore as foreign relations law of the
United States even before the United States adheres to the Convention.'
[citations omitted]).321 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
322 Id. at 322-23, (quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 81).
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circumstances of a foreign sovereign's effort to sue a state, at least, the
Supreme Court has held that the Constitution did not include such a plan
of surrender. 323 The court reached the same conclusion in a case that
upheld the state of Alaska's Eleventh Amendment immunity against suit
by sovereign Indian tribes.
32 4
Both of these suits addressed whether Eleventh Amendment
immunity was affected by the fact that the plaintiff was a sovereign, not
the issue of whether the treaty power constitutes an appropriate grant of
power for the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. They do indicate,
however, that the Supreme Court does not find that international concerns
are of sufficient importance to allow for an inroad on state sovereign
immunity.325 To the contrary, the Court has reasoned that international
concerns should not be forced on the states, which have no power to
adjust the terms of treaties. 326
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the field of foreign
relations and the Eleventh Amendment thus does not support the
proposition that it is likely to uphold the treaty power as an appropriate
basis for abrogation. The Court has warned that the Eleventh
Amendment can bar suits that invoke the federal question jurisdiction of
323 Id. at 330.
324 Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
325 This evaluation of the relationship between states' rights and state affairs is reinforced
by a recent set of cases that upheld the Commonwealth of Virginia's decision to execute
Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national. In denying an application for a stay of
execution, the Supreme Court upheld a Fourth Circuit ruling (Republic of Paraguay v.
Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998)) that barred the Republic of Paraguay's claims of
treaty violations on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352
(1998) (per curiam). Paraguay had alleged that Virginia had violated its rights under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, by
failing to inform Breard of his rights under the treaty and by failing to inform the
Paraguayan consulate of Breard's arrest, conviction, and sentence. The Supreme Court
rejected Paraguay's argument that the treaty claims should be heard in federal court
because the treaty is the "supreme law of the land," noting that "although treaties are
recognized by our Constitution as the supreme law of the land, that status is no less true
of provisions of the Constitution itself." Id. at 1355. Although the International Court of
Justice had ordered the United States to postpone the execution to give it time to consider
Paraguay's claim that the execution violated the United States' treaty obligations, the
Supreme Court denied the relief sought by both Breard and Paraguay. Over the
objections of the State Department, Breard was executed two hours after the Court
announced its decision. Vazquez, supra note 193, at n.42 and accompanying text. If
international opinion and human life stand for so little when the Court balances them
against states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, it seems unlikely that an endangered fly
or fish will fare much better.
326 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331 (1934).
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Article III courts,327 which would otherwise authorize the courts to hear
cases and controversies relating to treaties. It has also rejected any
construction of the Supremacy Clause that would hold that substantive
federal law, such as treaty obligations, "by its own force necessarily
overrides the sovereign immunity of the States."328 Those who protest
that international legal obligations should be considered a higher priority
than states' sovereign immunity might well be met with the retort that
"the contours of sovereign immunity are determined by the Founders'
understanding, not by the principles or limitations derived from natural
law.
3 29
Although the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has not
specifically rejected the possibility that treaty obligations might constitute
a basis for abrogation of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, its
current emphasis on the importance of states' rights over the importance
of substantive federal law does not appear to be receptive to this
argument.
C. Private Party Suits Against States Under the ESA
1. The Exparte Young Exception.
As previously discussed,330 the Ex parte Young doctrine provides
an exception to states' Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers in their individual
327 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997).
328 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999). The Court reasoned as follows:
As is evident from its text, however, the Supremacy Clause enshrines
as "the supreme Law of the Land" only those Federal Acts that accord
with the constitutional design... The Constitution, by delegating to
Congress the power to establish the supreme law of the land when
acting within its enumerated powers, does not foreclose a State from
asserting immunity to claims arising under federal law merely because
that law derives not from the State itself but from the national power..
. . We reject any contention that substantive federal law by its own
force necessarily overrides the sovereign immunity of the States. When
a State asserts its immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy of
federal law but the implementation of the law in a manner consistent
with the constitutional sovereignty of the States.
Id. at 731-32.
329 Id. at 734.
330 See supra, text accompanying notes 218-235.
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capacities. 331 This doctrine provides the most obvious path for private
parties seeking to enforce the ESA against the states.
All current indications support the view that the Ex parte Young
exception will be the most commonly used method to enforce the ESA and
other environmental laws. In Strahan v. Coxe, 332 the First Circuit upheld
the use of the Ex parte Young exception as a means to require
Massachusetts to change its regulatory system to comply with the ESA.
Other courts have also applied the doctrine to environmental laws with
citizens' suit provisions that closely resemble the ESA's provision. In
Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Department of
Transportation,333 a post-Seminole Tribe case, the Ninth Circuit held that
Ex parte Young allowed plaintiffs' Clean Water Act suit to proceed
against the director of the California Department of Transportation.
334
Federal district courts have reached the same conclusion under the Clean
Water Act 335 and, in an unpublished decision, under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act.
336
Unfortunately, the Ex parte Young doctrine is riddled with
exceptions and complications. The first, and most obvious, of these
problems is that it does not provide plaintiffs with any possibility of
money damages. In Edelman v. Jordan,337 the Supreme Court held that
relief designated as "equitable restitution" instead of damages still fell
afoul ofEx parte Young if it involved payments from the state treasury. 338
Even if plaintiffs do not request relief that involves payments from the
state treasury, but the Court believes that the relief requested is "as
intrusive" as a retroactive levy upon state funds, Ex parte Young may not
apply. This was the Court's holding in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho,339 which upheld Idaho's Eleventh Amendment defense to the
tribe's lawsuit alleging an ongoing state violation of tribal property rights
and requesting prospective injunctive relief. While the Court observed
that such an allegation "is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young
331 Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
332 127 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1997), discussed supra, text accompanying notes 88-94.
... 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996).
34 id. at 424.
335 Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 855 (E.D. Wis. 1998), dismissed on other
rounds.
Bragg v. Robertson, No. 2:98-0636, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22077, at *8-*9 (S.D. W.
Va. Oct. 9, 1998).
33 415 U.S. 651 (1974).331 Id. at 665-66.
339 521 U.S. 261, 287 (1997).
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fiction,"3 40 the Court found that "Idaho's sovereign interest in its lands and
waters would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any
conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury." 341 Because the
action resembled an action that would not be allowed under Ex parte
Young, the Court refused to apply Ex parte Young.342  As a result of the
Court's limitations on the form of relief available, plaintiffs suing under
the Exparte Young exception are barred from any form of monetary relief,
including penalties against state officials, from equitable relief involving
any form of monetary expenditures that could be interpreted as retroactive,
and from relief that is as "intrusive" as retroactive levies on state
treasuries.
This raises the second significant limitation of enforcement under
Ex parte Young: its ban on retrospective relief. The absence of monetary
damages could be viewed as a shortcoming that most significantly affects
private parties who contract with state governments; environmentalists and
other public interest groups, it may be assumed, should be happy with
prospective relief The absence of any form of retrospective relief could
have particularly pernicious environmental effects, however, in the states
that are the least likely to comply with the law. Such states could ignore
their federal obligations with impunity, secure in the knowledge that they
will not be liable for any past violations of the law.343 Unless and until a
court imposes prospective limitations on their behavior, states may even
view violating the law as a rational response to laws that their citizens do
not favor. As the court noted in Froebel v. Meyer,344 a federal district
court case that addressed allegations of Clean Water Act (CWA)
violations against the state, "[p]erversely, a state government that spends
money to avoid violating the Constitution ends up financially worse off
than one that cynically flouts higher law until ordered into prospective
compliance." 3
45
341 Id. at 281.
311 Id. at 287.
342 Id. at 282 ("the declaratory and injunctive relief the Tribe seeks is close to the
functional equivalent of quiet title" [emphasis added]).
343 See Vazquez, supra note 195, at 1792 (If prospective relief is the only recourse, "[t]he
state could, without assuming any risk, conduct itself entirely without regard to any
44ssible federal obligations until confronted with a legal challenge.").
13 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
4 Id. at 852 n.7. In Froebel, the District Court reluctantly upheld the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources' Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit under the
Clean Water Act, but applied the Ex parte Young doctrine to state officials. Id. Froebel's
Eleventh Amendment analysis is thoughtful, succinct, and respectfully critical of the
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This license to violate the law until enjoined by a court is further
assisted by the definition of "prospective" relief. A court's power to grant
prospective relief under Ex parte Young implies that the state's illegal
action must be ongoing, in order to be capable of prospective injunction.
As the court noted in Froebel, "this requirement dovetails with a
prerequisite for citizen suit jurisdiction under the CWA. ' '346 The CWA,
like the ESA, provides that an action may be brought "to enjoin any
person... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this [Act].
• . .347 In Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the Supreme Court
held that the CWA does not permit citizen suits for "wholly past"
violations.348 If the state violates the law, but manages to come into
compliance before a petition can be filed, its violation may be viewed as
"wholly past." 349 Although this requirement has not been applied directly
to the Endangered Species Act, Ex parte Young's requirement of
"prospective" relief may have the effect of applying the requirement to
ESA actions against the states. 350
One final uncertainty in the application of Ex parte Young is its
potential inapplicability when a state forum is available to vindicate
federal interests under the Act. In Coeur d'Alene, Justice Kennedy
contended that "a most important application of Ex parte Young" occurs
Supreme Court; it is recommended reading for those concerned with the relationship
between the Eleventh Amendment and the enforcement of environmental legislation.
346 Id. at 852.
147 13 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1999). The parallel provision in the ESA is found at 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g)(1 )(A) (1999) (emphasis added).
34' 484 U.S. 49, 63 (1987).
349 In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), the Supreme Court held
that there was no federal court jurisdiction over defendant Steel Company's failure to
submit the information required by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-
Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 100 Stat. 1755,42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1). During the sixty-
day notice prior to filing a citizens' suit complaint, the Steel Company managed to file all
of its overdue forms. These forms dated from 1988, when the statute passed, to 1995,
when the notice was sent. Id. at 287-88. The Supreme Court found that the violation was
"wholly past" and that citizens could not seek penalties for the company's failure to meet
statutory deadlines. Although the timely reporting of information for public use was one
of the primary purposes of the "Right-to-Know" Act, the Court's decision prevents the
psublic from enforcing this right in any meaningful way.
o On the other hand, although the statutory language at issue is the same in the CWA
and the ESA, the concept of a "wholly past violation" may take on a different meaning in
the area of species protection. One example could be a situation in which the ESA is
violated through the destruction of habitat for a listed species. Even if the action itself is
"wholly past," the adverse impacts on species could be ongoing. The possibility of
mitigation through habitat renewal or contributions to habitat in other areas may
constitute "prospective relief' for this ongoing violation.
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when no state forum is available to vindicate federal interests. 351 When a
state forum is available, "there is neither warrant nor necessity to adopt the
Young device to provide an adequate judicial forum for resolving the
dispute."3
52
Although Justice Kennedy was not writing for the plurality at this
point in the decision,353 the Froebel court raised a similar concern based
on an earlier Supreme Court case. Froebel noted that Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman354 held that "prospective relief enjoining
violations of state rather than federal law fell outside the scope of the
Young exception."355 The Froebel court then raised the possibility that Ex
parte Young might not apply to a state's alleged violation of water quality
standards under the CWA, which allows states to issue permits and which
gives EPA and the states concurrent authority over violations of state-
issued permits.356 This "federalist allocation of authority," the court
noted, complicates the question of whether the alleged violation fell under
state law or federal law for purposes of Pennhurst.357 After defining this
issue as "a potentially complicated question that touches on federal
supremacy, institutional practice and agency discretion" 358 and noting that
the "effect of Pennhurst in this context appears unclear,"359 the court
found a way to avoid having to reason through these complicated issues.
Relying on "other federal courts [that] have entertained citizen actions
alleging violations of [the CWA] by state officers without addressing this
issue," the court held that Pennhurst did not bar the application of Ex
parte Young to the claim against state officials.
360
At first glance, the issue of the availability of a state forum may
not appear to apply to the ESA, which grants exclusive enforcement
jurisdiction to the federal district courts.36' The CWA, however, contains
the same exclusive grant of federal jurisdiction.362  While the ESA does
351 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997).
352 Id. at 274.
353 Justice Kennedy was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist in this section of the
o inion.
3465 U.S. 89 (1984).






361 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e) (1999).
362 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1999).
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not include as well-defined a scheme of cooperative federalism as is
contained in the CWA, it does allow federal agencies to enter into
cooperative agreements "with any State which establishes and maintains
an adequate and active program for the conservation of endangered
species and threatened species."363  State authority under cooperative
agreements and other provisions of the ESA could evoke the same
problems under Ex parte Young that concerned the court in Froebel. The
Fifth Circuit's decision in Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio,364 in which
the court abstained from hearing an ESA suit because the state had
adopted an aquifer regulatory scheme, 365 shows the real possibility that
courts could discount federal enforcement in favor of state law.
For all of these reasons, the Ex parte Young doctrine constitutes a
"wholly unreliable means of citizen redress against states."3 66 Although
Strahan indicates that sympathetic federal courts may apply the doctrine in
order to hear enforcement actions against states, other courts-such as the
Fifth Circuit-may be able to find ways to preclude federal jurisdiction
entirely, even when state officials are named in actions for prospective
relief.
2. State Consent/Waiver
Private citizens may sue a state if it has waived its sovereign
immunity and consented to suit.367  The Supreme Court's decision in
College Savings Bank368 overruled the theory of constructive waiver that
had supported Palila's holding that the state had waived its sovereign
363 16 U.S.C. § 1535(C)(1) (1999); see also supra Part H.B.3 (discussing cooperative
afreements).
112 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997).
365 Sierra Club did not even involve the availability of a state forum for the claim at issue;
the court admitted that the state law did not appear to allow citizens' suits. Id. at 794.
The mere availability of a state regulatory scheme was sufficient for the court to abstain
from exercising federal jurisdiction over a citizen's suit. See supra, text accompanying
notes 175-177.
36 Courtney E. Flora, An Inapt Fiction: The Use of the Ex Parte Young Doctrine for
Environmental Citizen Suits Against States After Seminole Tribe, 27 ENVTL. L. 935, 965
(1997).
367 "[W]e have not questioned the general proposition that a State may waive its
sovereign immunity and consent to suit.... ." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737 (1999).
368 Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 US. 666,
680 (1999).
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immunity to suit under the ESA. 369 Therefore, state waivers of Eleventh
Amendment immunity must be explicit.
Several factors could, conceivably, convince states to waive their
sovereign immunity to ESA enforcement. First, pressure from the ESA
implementing agencies, FWS and NMFS, could convince states to waive
their immunity. States with large-scale listings also might find that
environmental and private property interests are not willing to participate
in state schemes if they know enforcement will not be available under the
ESA. States might waive their sovereign immunity under both of these
scenarios in order to avoid a reversion to federal control.
Congress also could include a requirement to waive state sovereign
immunity when it disburses funds that support state ESA programs. The
Supreme Court has upheld similar uses of Congress' spending power
when four conditions have been met. First, "the exercise of the spending
power must be in pursuit of the 'general welfare. ,, 370 Second, conditions
on state receipts of federal funds must be unambiguous. 371 Third,
"conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.' 372 These
conditions should not raise significant barriers, particularly in light of the
ESA's firm grounding in the value of species preservation "to the Nation
and its people." 3
73
The fourth condition is that the conditional grant of federal funds
must not be barred by other constitutional provisions.374 If this phrase
were interpreted to mean that Congress may not use the spending power to
regulate that which it is prohibited from regulating directly, Congress
could not condition ESA funding on states' waiver of sovereign immunity.
Under this interpretation, the fact that Congress could not directly
abrogate state sovereign immunity would also prevent Congress from
using the spending power to require states to waive their sovereign
immunity. The Supreme Court directly rejected this interpretation,
however, in South Dakota v. Dole,375 a case that upheld the withholding of
federal transportation funds from states that sell alcohol to those younger
than twenty-one years of age. The Court held instead that this limitation
369 See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 997 (D. Haw.
1979).
370 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
371 id.
372 Id. (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
313 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(a)(3) (1999).
314 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
37 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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on the spending power simply means that the power may not be used to
"induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional. 376
It is not unconstitutional for states to waive their sovereign
immunity; in fact, College Savings. Board reaffirmed that a state's
sovereign immunity is "'a personal privilege (that) it may waive at
pleasure."' 377 Furthermore, the inducement of federal funds will not be
viewed as coercive unless 'pressure turns into compulsion.' 378 Although
the Court has not established a clear cutoff between pressure and
compulsion, states' acceptance of funding to implement cooperative
agreements and other ESA programs would not be likely to qualify as
"compulsion." Therefore, it appears that Congress could attach at least
part, if not all, of federal ESA funding to a requirement that states waive
sovereign immunity.
D. Private Party Suits Involving Non-ESA Claims
1. State Court Actions under State Law
One obvious solution to Eleventh Amendment immunity problems
is to bypass federal jurisdiction completely. If a relevant state cause of
action exists, private parties may sue in state court, under state law-
assuming that the state has waived sovereign immunity in its own
courts.
379
Although this may be one solution to the problem of enforcement
against states, it is not necessarily an optimal solution. States' respect for
species preservation varies; some state resource management agencies,
and state legislators, have the reputation of putting economic interests in
tourism and resource extraction before species protection.38 0  These
376 Id. at 210.
377 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
675 (1999) (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)).
371 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (citation omitted).
379 Not all states have waived sovereign immunity to suit. In the area of contract law, for
example, where most states view sovereign immunity as an out-of-date barrier to efficient
operations, the courts of four states-Texas, Vermont, Arkansas, and Kentucky-
"always" uphold sovereign immunity in contract disputes. See Gary Taylor, The
Nation's Bastion of Contract Immunity, NAT'L L.J. May 29, 1995, at Al, A21.
380 See, e.g., John M. Gaff-m, Can We Conserve California's Threatened Fisheries
Through Natural Community Conservation Planning? 27 ENVTL. L. 791, 794 (1997)
("Unfortunately, many natural resource advocates in northern California hold the
Resources Agency of California (Resources Agency) in low esteem. Advocates feel that
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differences may be reflected in state courts. At a broader level, many
litigants prefer to avoid state courts because of the courts' perceived bias
or prejudice in favor of states. As one commentator has noted, "[s]tate
judges may have the comfort born of long familiarity with the state's
attorney, they may be unduly deferential to the testimony in favor of state
officials, or they may be inclined to be protective of the state treasury.
381
Finally, archaic state rules and other peculiarities may afflict state court
systems. Commentators have noted, for example, that "[c]oncerned
citizens seeking to challenge Oregon state agency decisions must brave the
state judicial scheme, which former Chief Justice Patterson of the Oregon
Supreme Court has described as 'inefficient, unpredictable, ineffective,
expensive, and unresponsive.'
382
The impact of the Eleventh Amendment cases has been described
as "revolutioniz[ing] not only the relationship between states and the
federal government, but also between states and their citizens." 3 3 Part of
this revolution may well take place in state courts, which may begin to
hear disputes between the states and their citizens that otherwise would
have taken place in federal district court. The outcome may be a wide
variation in the standard for species protection across the states.
2. Federal Takings Lawsuits Under the Fifth Amendment
Private landowners that claim state agencies have violated
contractual obligations under the ESA may evaluate the option of pursuing
a "takings" claim against the state pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth
for many years, the Resources Agency has persistently failed to meet its responsibility to
protect the natural resources of the state." (citation omitted)); Sherry Marie Cote, Note,
The Manatee: Facing Imminent Extinction, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 189, 201 (1994) ("The
main problem with the [Florida] State protections afforded to the Florida Manatee ... is
that the legislature is too concerned with the rights of fishermen and recreational boaters
to provide comprehensive protection for the Florida Manatee."). See generally Tarlock,
supra note 19, at 562 ("Our traditional suburban Social Darwinism and the limited
geographical scale of local governments create few incentives for them to consider any
but the most immediate and short-term external costs of land development. Biodiversity
protection, in contrast, requires local governments to restrain land development in
sP ecific landscapes ... ." (citation omitted)).
3 1 See Brant, supra note 201, at 771.
382 See Blumm & Lovvorn, supra note 22, at 392 n.215 (quoting Forman v. Clatsop, 297
Or. 129, 133 (1984) (Petersen, C.J., concurring)).
383 See Brant, supra note 381, at 772.
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Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.384 Claims attempting to prove a
taking of contractual rights face a familiar hurdle: that of sovereign
immunity. The sovereign must unmistakably be shown to have
surrendered its immunity before a vested contractual right will be
found.385 As has been noted in another context, "[p]rivate parties may be
able to enforce [ESA] implementing agreements by means of a takings
claim. This route is fraught with uncertainty, however," 386 and does not
provide an entirely reliable basis on which to ensure that ESA agreements
with states can be implemented.
E. Non-Private Party Enforcement: Reliance on Federal Enforcement
Against States
There is no question that the federal government may enforce
federal legislation against states.3 87 In Alden v. Maine,88 the Supreme
Court explained that a suit brought against a state
[B]y those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to
'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' differs in
kind from the suit of an individual .... Suits brought by
the United States itself require. the exercise of political
responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a
control which is absent from a broad delegation to private
persons to sue nonconsenting States.389
This, then, is the goal of the Supreme Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence: to reduce the scope of citizens' suits in favor
of federal enforcement, if, when, and to the extent that political factors
allow such suits to be brought.
384 See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (finding the Fifth Amendment's
protection against taking property without just compensation extends to contracts with
the United States).
385 See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52
(1986).386 Melious & Thornton, supra note 100, at 540.
387 "We have hitherto found a surrender of immunity against particular litigants in only
two contexts: suits by sister States and suits by the United States." Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (citations omitted).
388 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
389 See id. at 755-56 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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In the case of the ESA, federal oversight is the most important
means of federal enforcement. The federal government has the authority
not to approve state plans and to shape state policies through federal/state
partnerships. If states do not live up to their ESA obligations,
environmentalists as well as the Supreme Court would probably
appreciate it if the federal government acted as the enforcer. The current
regulatory system, in which environmentalists frequently are the parties
who sue to enforce the ESA, "sets up environmentalists to look like
spoilers. ' '390 Neither reported cases of federal enforcement against the
states-none exists391-nor the ESA budget3 92 provides much support,
however, for the notion that citizen enforcement will be replaced by
vigorous federal action.
Monetary constraints are not the only important factor that will
limit federal enforcement actions against states. Federal agencies are also
subject to political constraints, including electoral pressures on Congress
and the President, arising from landowners as well as from environmental
groups.393 They are also involved in ongoing relationships with states,
and must weigh the possible benefits of any given enforcement action
against the possible harm to their long-term role within the state.
Furthermore, even when the federal government decides to bring
an action against a state, it is quite likely that the federal interest will not
coincide precisely with the interests of private parties. The aftermath to
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe394 demonstrates this problem clearly. In
Coeur d'Alene, the Supreme Court barred the tribe's claim to submerged
lands in the Lake Coeur d'Alene water system, finding that the state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity shielded it from the tribe's claims.
395
390 See Ray Ring, Saving the Platte, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 1, 1999, at 1.
39 1 This is typical of enforcement under the ESA in general. See Ruhl, supra note 17, at
598 n.124 ("FWS has seldom prosecuted administrative, civil, or criminal actions solely
on the ground of habitat modification; rather, citizen group litigation has been the
rincipal source of case law regarding the scope of the harm definition in that regard.").
See supra, note 151. The paucity of finding for ESA programs helps to ensure that
federal agencies and states work together, rather than meeting as adversaries. See, e.g.,
Oregon Exec. Order No. EO 99-01, The Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds (Jan. 8,
1999), available at http://www.oregon-plan.org/Eo99-01.htm (noting that ensuring state
and local planning are necessary under the ESA because "[t]o date, the FWS and NMFS
generally have not had the resources to develop and implement effective recovery plans
for fisheries.").
393 See generally Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through?: Takings Jurisprudence
Meets the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 863-64 (1997).
'94 521 U.S. 261 (1999).
391 id. at 287-88.
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The ruling did not, however, affect a suit brought by the United States
Justice Department on behalf of the Department of the Interior, which
became involved at the tribe's request. In pursuing the action, the
Justice Department only addressed the tribe's ownership of the southern
third of Lake Coeur d'Alene; the tribe had claimed ownership of the
entire lake. The federal government did not pursue the entire claim
because it contended that the tribe sold the northern part of its
reservation, including the lake, to the federal government. 97
Federal enforcement of private party complaints under the ESA,
like the federal enforcement of the Tribe's claim, thus may be partial and
subservient to the federal interest. If private parties can interest the federal
government in an action against a state in the first place, they may find
that the ultimate scope of the actions does not address all of their
concerns.
398
F. Avoiding State Immunity: Enforcement Against Local Governments
Local governments may be liable under the ESA both for
regulatory actions that constitute an illegal "take" of endangered
species 39 and for failing to take action that would prevent an illegal
"take" of endangered species.400 Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity does not extend to suits brought against a municipal
corporation or other governmental entity that is not an "arm of the
396 See Susan Drumheller, Lake CDA Ownership Goes to Trial; Tribe, State to Dispute
History, With Future Governance at Stake, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, WA), Nov. 30,
1997, at Al.
397 See Susan Drumheller, Tribe Says Lake Source of Culture; Showing Indians'
Dependence on Lake for Livelihood May Help Prove Ownership, SPOKESMAN-REV.
(Spokane, WA), Dec. 9, 1997, at B1.
398 It is difficult to imagine that the federal government would bring an action on behalf
of private property owners under the HCP provisions of the ESA, for example, if no
strong federal interest were involved. Even if such an action were pursued, it seems
equally unlikely that the federal interest would extend to purely private claims of loss.
This could leave landowners without recourse for the very state actions concerning them
most: those affecting private property values.
399 Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 148 F.3d 1231 (11 th
Cir. 1998).
400 United States v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998). The
court granted FWS' request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the town's failure to
prevent off-road vehicles from driving through the nests and habitat of piping plovers
(listed as "threatened" under the ESA) violated the ESA. See id. at 82.
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State."40' It is likely, therefore, that local governments will bear the brunt
of states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. It will generally be
easier to sue local governments under the ESA than to attempt to navigate
the shoals of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The possibility of actions against local governments will help to
fill the gap left by the states' sovereign immunity. If one local
government is found liable under the ESA, this determination will
undoubtedly have a deterrent effect on other local governments. This
option obviously will not address state-specific obligations, however,
including contractual obligations taken on by the states through the HCP
process. The inability to enforce HCP obligations against states may
effectively require that state participation in federal-state conservation
401 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); see also, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v.
Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199 (1929) (Eleventh Amendment immunizes state
agency that was "but the arm or alter ego of the State"). The rationale is that a plaintiff
who successfully sued an arm of the state would have a judgment with "the same effect
as if it were rendered against the State for the amount specified in the complaint." Smith
v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 439 (1900). In contrast, the Court has "consistently refused to
construe the Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties
and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a slice of state power." Lake
Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979).
In determining whether or not an entity is a state entity, the primary factor,
reflecting "the Eleventh Amendment's core concern," is "whether any judgment [against
the entity] must be satisfied out of the state treasury." Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson
Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 51 (1994). The Supreme Court has held that a bi- or multi-state
agency, created under the Compact Clause, does not qualify for Eleventh Amendment
immunity, "[u]nless there is good reason to believe that the States structured the new
agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States themselves,
and that Congress concurred in that purpose." Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401; see
also Hess, 513 U.S. at 32-33 (Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation does not have
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
As an example of a circuit court test used to determine whether or not an entity
is a state agency, the Ninth Circuit applies the following factors:
whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds,
whether the entity performs central governmental functions, whether
the entity may sue or be sued, whether the entity has the power to take
property in its own name or only the name of the state, and the
corporate status of the entity.
Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1081 (1989). Applying this analysis, the Ninth Circuit has found that
the Wyoming Community Development Authority, an entity created by state law to
promote affordable housing and economic development, was not an arm of the state for
purposes of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Durning v. Citibank, N.A.,
950 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991).
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programs be implemented through local and regional authorities rather
than through the state itself.
As a result, it may be more difficult to develop comprehensive
state conservation schemes for wide-ranging species, such as West Coast
salmon species, because the enforceability of the states' commitments to
implement conservation measures may be suspect. Private landowners
and local governments may be reluctant to agree to make commitments to
habitat conservation if they conclude state agencies are effectively
immune from enforcement of the obligations to which they commit; the
environmental community may be less likely to endorse innovative state
conservation commitments as an alternative to federal regulatory
approaches if there are significant questions about the enforceability of
the states' commitments.
In order to avoid these potential problems, the federal ESA
implementing agencies can help to provide non-federal parties with
assurances that state obligations will be met. In particular, the regulatory
reach of the ESA allows the federal ESA implementing agencies
effectively to impose a statewide conservation scheme as a condition to
receiving relief from the Section 9 prohibition against "take." For
example, while the state of California played a critical role in the
initiation and implementation of the state Natural Community
Conservation Plan, FWS ensured a consistent range-wide conservation
program for the threatened California gnatcatcher through its 4(d) rule.4 °2
Such continuing federal oversight can provide important assurances to
non-federal parties of the enforceability of state activities.
G. Potential Standing Issues
If states are not included in ESA litigation, some plaintiffs may
face standing challenges. To satisfy standing requirements, plaintiffs
must show that their injury is "fairly traceable" to the actions of the
defendant and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable
decision.403 In Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County,
Florida, 404 the county challenged the plaintiffs' standing on both "fairly
traceable" and redressability grounds. The "fairly traceable" element
402 See Thomas S. Reid & Dennis D. Murphy, Providing a Regional Context for Local
Conservation Action: A National Community Conservation Plan for the Southern
California Coastal Sage Scrub, BIOSCIENCE, June 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL
12103824.
403 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citations omitted).
404 148 F.3d 1231 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
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focuses on the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury,
and "[t]he causal link may become 'too attenuated' if the injury is 'the
result of the independent action of some third party not before the
court."' 40 5 The county claimed that, in incorporated areas, municipalities
within the county had regulatory authority over the beachfront lighting
that was alleged to "take" endangered turtles. Therefore, the county
contended, the line of causation went to the municipalities, not to the
county. Furthermore, if these municipalities were not included in the
action, plaintiffs' injury could not be redressed.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument. It cited the terms of
the county charter, which provided that the county "shall" establish
minimum standards for the protection of the environment, applicable
within both incorporated and unincorporated areas of the county.
Municipalities could establish more restrictive, but not less restrictive,
ordinances.40 6 The court also noted that the county had, in fact, adopted a
county-wide ordinance governing beach lighting. 07 The court concluded
that the county's overall regulatory authority established a sufficient
causal link. The fact that the municipalities had the authority to enact
more onerous lighting standards did not "sever the 'fairly traceable'
connection between Volusia County's regulatory actions and the Turtles'
alleged 'harm.'4°S
This argument could play out in reverse if a private party sued
local governments, but not the state, for harm to a species subject to state
programs under the ESA. Local governments might contend that they
were merely complying with state law, and that any harm under the ESA
was "fairly traceable" to the state. This would not be a particularly strong
argument in states that allowed local governments to adopt more stringent
regulation; unlike the situation in Loggerhead Turtle, local governments'
ability to regulate more stringently would be relevant to their direct
liability under the ESA. In areas of the country that are less sympathetic
to the ESA, however, courts could seize this opportunity to avoid
compelling local governments to take unpopular actions to implement an
unpopular law.
405 Id. at 1247 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
"6 Id. at 1247-48.
4 7 Id. at 1248.
4"8 Id. at 1249.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Much of the innovation that has occurred under the ESA in the last
decade has resulted from state programs, including the California Natural
Community Conservation Program, the Oregon Salmon Initiative, and
other state-initiated habitat conservation programs. It will certainly be
ironic if the Supreme Court's expansive view of state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment has a chilling effect on these experiments
in providing an alternative to federal regulation.
Although intended to protect states from the "indignity" of private
enforcement, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity could instead lead
non-federal parties to view state species protection measures with
suspicion.4 0 9 With Palila's reasoning and holding on state sovereign
immunity effectively overruled, the states' obligations under the ESA will
only be fully enforceable if the federal government decides to enforce, a
decision that will be strongly affected by politics and budgetary
constraints. For non-federal parties, only prospective equitable relief is
likely to be available in federal court. State court relief may be
available-if state law provides for citizens' suits, if the state has waived
its sovereign immunity, if the suit is not removed to federal court, and if
the state scheme provides for appropriate relief.
As a result of Eleventh Amendment constraints, non-federal ESA
enforcement actions are likely to focus on the activities of local
governments, rather than states. In areas where local and regional
interests are bitterly opposed to the ESA, this could lead to significant
conflicts--conflicts that the states may be in a position to defuse. The
spectre of enforcement against local agencies may encourage states to act
as brokers between the federal government and local governments,
establishing innovative programs and approaches to help local
governments comply with the ESA under the regulatory control and
supervision of the federal agencies. This would allow the states to
409 Justice Breyer has noted this problem, in more general terms:
[The Court's state sovereign immunity] rules will inhibit the creation of
innovative legal regimes, say, incentive-based or decentralized
regulatory systems, that deliberately take account of local differences
by assigning roles, powers, or responsibility, not just to federal
administrators, but to citizens, at least if such a regime must incorporate
a private remedy against a State (e.g., a State as water polluter) to work
effectively.
Coil. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 702
(1999).
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continue to act as laboratories for ESA experimentation and to infuse the
experience and expertise of state regulatory agencies into ESA
compliance.
The effect of the Eleventh Amendment on the ESA thus need not
be entirely negative. It does not exclude the possibility of an important
state role in ESA implementation. This approach would not, however,
resolve the problem of the enforceability of strictly state actions that fall
within the purview of the ESA. Even if local governments are likely
surrogates for some ESA enforcement actions, non-federal parties simply
may not be able to enforce ESA requirements relating to state actions such
as state timber harvests, state land disposal and development, and hunting
regulation.
This leads to the central paradox of the Court's recent Eleventh
Amendment cases: that these "states' rights decision[s] that purport[] to
decentralize power would shift enforcement from private individuals to
more centralized Federal bureaucracies." 410  State sovereign immunity
increases the significance of enforcement by the federal ESA agencies, not
the role of local citizens. Private attorneys general may (or may not) be
replaced by public attorneys general; local goals of the nongovernmental
sector may be supplanted by the exigencies of the federal bureaucracy. As
Justice Breyer observed in his dissent to College Savings Bank,
"Federalism matters to ordinary citizens seeking to maintain a degree of
control, a sense of community, in an increasingly interrelated and complex
world."4'1 The Supreme Court's misplaced sense of charity to states is
likely to diminish, rather than increase, communities' control over the
interrelated and complex issues of species preservation.
410 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Federal Power, Undimmed, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 4, at
17.
411 Coll. Say. Bank, 666 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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